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ABSTRACT—The most sensible reconciliation of the tension between 
religious liberty and public accommodations law, in the recent cases 
involving merchants with religious objections to same-sex marriage, would 
permit business owners to present their views to the world, but forbid them 
either to threaten to discriminate or to treat any individual customer worse 
than others. Even if such businesses have no statutory right to refuse to 
facilitate ceremonies they regard as immoral, they are unlikely to be asked 
to participate in those ceremonies. This solution may, however, be 
forbidden by the law of hostile environment harassment. That raises a 
severe free speech problem, but the Supreme Court has left the pertinent 
doctrine in a state of confusion. I offer a better account of free speech law, 
one that depends on some neglected free speech values—the protection of 
religious disagreement, the promotion of mutual transparency among 
persons, and the positive valuation of ethical confrontation. I conclude that, 
under familiar rules of constitutional avoidance, state antidiscrimination 
laws should be construed to allow this kind of speech. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2012, a Chicago-based group, The Civil Rights Agenda, filed a 
human rights complaint against the Chick-fil-A restaurant chain, claiming 
that “the company’s widely published corporate philosophy, culture, and 
policies” convey to homosexuals that they are unwelcome in its 
restaurants.1 Chick-fil-A had contributed millions of dollars to 
organizations opposed to same-sex marriage.2 The complaint cited 
statements by the company’s Chief Operating Officer, Dan Cathy, that 
“[a]s an organization we operate on Biblical principles” and “[w]e are 
inviting God’s judgment on our nation when we shake our fist at him and 
1 Charge of Discrimination, Zaharakis v. Chick-fil-A Rest., No. 2013CP0317 (Ill. Dep’t of Human 
Rights, Aug. 2, 2012), http://volokh.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/ChickfilAComplaint.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QDD8-VC6W]; see also David Badash, BREAKING: Chick-Fil-A Gets Multiple 
Human Rights Act Complaints Filed Against Them, NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (Aug. 2, 2012, 
11:02 AM), http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/breaking_chick_fil_a_gets_multiple_human
_rights_act_complaints_filed_against_them [https://perma.cc/J8ZZ-DMMU]. 
2 Chick-fil-A Donated Nearly $2 Million to Anti-Gay Groups in 2010, EQUALITY MATTERS (July 2, 
2012, 9:26 AM), http://equalitymatters.org/factcheck/201207020001 [https://perma.cc/34KG-79GY]. 
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say, ‘We know better than you as to what constitutes a marriage.[’]”3 The 
complainant wrote: “As a result of the foregoing published statements 
regarding Chick-fil-A’s corporate philosophy, culture and policies, as an 
unmarried homosexual in a ‘non-traditional’ family unit, I know that my 
family and I are looked down upon, loathed, unwelcome, objectionable and 
unacceptable to Chick-fil-A.”4 (As of this writing the complaint is still 
pending before the Illinois Department of Human Rights.5) 
The complaint had a reasonable basis in Illinois law, which declares 
that no “place of public accommodation” may “publish, circulate, [or] 
display” any communication “which the operator knows is to the effect that 
any of the facilities of the place of public accommodation will be denied to 
any person or that any person is unwelcome, objectionable or unacceptable 
because of unlawful discrimination.”6 Chick-fil-A’s public statements of 
opposition to homosexuality have become so notorious that the company’s 
name alone indicates such opposition. (At Northwestern University School 
of Law, catering by Chick-fil-A at a Federalist Society-sponsored event on 
same-sex marriage produced a bitter controversy.7) The complainant is 
probably sincere when he says that the well-known corporate policies of 
Chick-fil-A make him feel unwelcome there. If the law forbids any action 
by a public accommodation that makes some customers feel unwelcome, 
then his claim is meritorious. 
You probably think that the complaint raises grave First Amendment 
problems.8 Under present constitutional doctrine, it is not clear that it does. 
The law of hostile environment harassment demands that no member 
of a protected class be treated worse than others—for example, by being 
3 Charge of Discrimination, Zaharakis, No. 2013CP0317. 
4 Id. 
5 Telephone Interview with Jacob Meister, Chairman, The Civil Rights Agenda (June 2, 2016). The 
company has since stopped funding organizations opposed to gay rights. Chick-fil-A Same-Sex 
Marriage Controversy, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chick-fil-A_same-sex_marriage_
controversy [perma.cc/W6NR-FRJJ]. The company also may have been responding to statements by 
prominent politicians, notably the mayors of Chicago and Boston, that they would not allow franchises 
to open in their cities unless the company changed its policies. Denying permits because of 
disagreement with the applicant’s political views is an obvious First Amendment violation and clearly 
would have been struck down if challenged, but there has been no litigation on this point. 
6 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-102 (2014). 
7 Staci Zaretsky & Joe Patrice, Fed Soc Chapter Offers Chick-fil-A at Gay Marriage Event with 
Disastrous Results, ABOVE THE LAW (Sept. 23, 2014, 11:38 AM), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2014/09/fedsoc-chapter-offers-chick-fil-a-at-gay-marriage-event-with-
disastrous-results/ [perma.cc/BP6W-AA2E]. I was a participant in the event, commenting on a talk by 
Ryan Anderson, a prominent opponent of same-sex marriage. 
8 For a compilation of arguments that it does, see Doug Mataconis, Civil Rights Group Alleges 
Discrimination by Chick-fil-A Because of Dan Cathy’s Opinion, OUTSIDE THE BELTWAY (Aug. 11, 
2012), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/civil-rights-group-alleges-discrimination-by-chick-fil-a-
because-of-dan-cathys-opinion/ [perma.cc/HZY6-JK8J]. 
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made to feel unwelcome—at a place of public accommodation. The law of 
free speech demands, or more precisely should demand, that the proprietor 
of that place of public accommodation have the right to share his thoughts 
with the world. These demands point in opposite directions, and doctrine 
must be constructed in a way that accommodates both. The Court has not 
done that. Instead, it has laid down two contradictory lines of pertinent law, 
and then has made matters worse by foreclosing any future reshaping of 
First Amendment law. 
If the law of free speech protects anything, it should protect heretical 
speech—speech that dissents from dominant values. It is commonly 
thought that protection of political discussion is the central purpose of the 
Free Speech Clause. Dissenting religious speech is, however, the original, 
primitive core of free speech protection. The speech of Chick-fil-A is a 
specimen of that. The notions that same-sex relationships are immoral, and 
that same-sex marriage is intrinsically impossible—ideas that are generally 
based on religious beliefs9—are increasingly unpopular. Hostile 
environment law threatens to block business owners from communicating 
these views. 
The most sensible reconciliation of the tension would permit business 
owners to present their views to the world, but forbid them either to 
threaten to discriminate or to treat any individual customer worse than 
others. The Court is unlikely to offer us anything like this. For decades it 
has shown no interest in the problem.10 State courts, however, can 
accomplish the same result when they interpret their antidiscrimination 
statutes. The familiar rule of avoidance of constitutional difficulties 
supports that interpretation. 
That could help solve the pressing problem of the collision, in public 
accommodations law,11 between gay rights and conservative religion.12 If 
proprietors who object to same-sex marriage could make their views 
known, then even if they have no statutory right to refuse to facilitate 
9 See Frank Newport, Religion Big Factor for Americans Against Same-Sex Marriage, GALLUP 
(Dec. 5, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/159089/religion-major-factor-americans-opposed-sex-
marriage.aspx [perma.cc/2DDP-DC3X] (Americans who oppose same-sex marriage “are most likely to 
explain their position on the basis of religious beliefs and/or interpretation of biblical passages.”). 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 13–21. 
11 I do not address the rather different issue of state officials who conscientiously object to 
facilitating same-sex marriage. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Religious Accommodations for County Clerks?, 
76 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 87 (2015) (analyzing claims against Kentucky County Clerk Kim 
Davis). 
12 This is often described as a conflict between gay rights and religion. This is misleading, since 
every major religious denomination in the United States is split on this issue—part of a longstanding 
division in American religion between orthodox and progressive religiosity. See generally JAMES 
DAVISON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRUGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA (1991). 
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ceremonies they regard as immoral, they are unlikely to be asked to 
participate in those ceremonies. On the contrary, same-sex couples will 
almost all want nothing to do with them. The conflict between the groups 
can be avoided to the extent that they are kept far apart from one another. 
Announcements of the proprietor’s views will not absolutely guarantee that 
service will not be demanded, but it will make such demands rare. A high 
but less than perfect rate of success is all that can be demanded of any legal 
rule. 
Both sides will have qualms about this proposal. Gay people 
reasonably fear a climate of pervasive hatred against them—many have a 
lot of personal experience of that—and conservative Christians reasonably 
fear threats and vandalism if they disclose their views. This is not a perfect 
solution. It is merely less bad than the alternatives. 
It is also demanded by the First Amendment’s protection of free 
speech. Any legitimate regime allows dissent, and a business owner’s 
premises are usually the only medium by which she realistically can hope 
to broadcast her message. 
Part I of this Article explains how the Court has left the question of 
free speech limits on hostile environment law in a state of confusion. Part II 
shows how this confusion stands in the way of a free speech-based solution 
to the conflict. Part III examines the Court’s rigid, static understanding of 
the First Amendment, which impairs its capacity to devise sensible 
exceptions to free speech. Part IV considers some neglected free speech 
values—the protection of religious disagreement, the promotion of mutual 
transparency among persons, and the positive valuation of ethical 
confrontation—and shows their tension with the purposes of 
antidiscrimination law. Part V further explores that tension by examining 
one case, the Oregon litigation over a bakery’s refusal to make a wedding 
cake for a same-sex couple. Part VI argues that state courts should construe 
their antidiscrimination statutes to permit businesses to make their 
objections to same-sex marriage known to the public—a step which is 
likely to keep almost all gay customers away and so prevent such cases 
from arising in the future. The Conclusion reflects on the interaction of free 
speech and toleration. 
I. TWO (CONTRADICTORY) LEGAL OPINIONS ON FREE SPEECH AND
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT 
There is, in principle, a deep tension between antidiscrimination law 
and free speech law. The prohibition of discrimination dictates that 
members of protected classes cannot be treated worse than others in the 
workplace, or in public accommodations. Hostile speech is one way of 
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treating a group worse than others. Yet such speech is defined by its 
viewpoint, and viewpoint-based restrictions on speech are almost always 
unconstitutional. 
The Supreme Court has never acknowledged this tension. On the 
contrary, it has laid down two pertinent but contradictory lines of authority. 
A. Hostile Environment Raises No Free Speech Issue
One group of cases indicates that antidiscrimination law raises no free 
speech issues at all. The free speech question was extensively briefed in 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,13 in which the Court upheld a harassment 
claim that was based largely on the male company president’s constant 
sexual innuendo and sex-based ridicule of female employees. The Court 
made no mention of First Amendment limits in its opinion.14 “After 
Harris,” Professor Richard Fallon observed, “it is virtually inconceivable 
that the Supreme Court might hold that the First Amendment forbids the 
imposition of Title VII liability for a broad category of sexually harassing 
speech.”15 Frederick Schauer interpreted the Court’s silence as “saying, in 
as strong a way as it could, that the defendant’s First Amendment 
arguments were so trivial that they did not even deserve a mention in the 
United States Reports.”16 
A year earlier, the Court had offered a partial explanation of its refusal 
to protect certain harassing speech. It declared that restriction of speech on 
the basis of its content is permissible when “a particular content-based 
subcategory of a proscribable class of speech” is “swept up incidentally 
within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech . . . . 
Thus, for example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’ among other 
words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition against 
sexual discrimination in employment practices.”17 
This is not a satisfactory explanation. Hostile environment law targets 
much more than “a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable 
class of speech.”18 The company president’s actionable statements in 
Harris, such as “You’re a woman, what do you know” and “We need a 
13 510 U.S. 17, 19–21 (1993). 
14 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the First Amendment 
Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7–10. 
15 Id. at 9. For a similar reading of Harris, see KENT GREENAWALT, FIGHTING WORDS:
INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES, AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH 82 (1995). 
16 Frederick Schauer, The Speech-ing of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT LAW 347, 356 (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004).  
17 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 
501 U.S. 560, 571 (1991) (plurality opinion)).  
18 Id. 
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man as the rental manager,”19 are not fighting words or any other type of 
proscribable speech. If, on the other hand, otherwise protected speech were 
regulable whenever it were “swept up incidentally within the reach of a 
statute directed at conduct rather than speech,”20 then there would be no 
constitutional difficulty with the suit against Chick-fil-A. The Illinois law 
does not target speech. The Court, however, has since made clear that even 
if a law “may be described as directed at conduct,” it will be subject to 
strict scrutiny if “as applied . . . the conduct triggering coverage under the 
statute consists of communicating a message.”21 
And that is it. That is all that the Court has said specifically about free 
speech limits on harassment law. The Court has never been confronted with 
a speech restriction as egregious as that proposed in the Illinois case, but its 
minimalist treatment of the harassment question implies that there is no 
constitutional problem with any application of harassment law. That is how 
it has been read by lower courts, which have summarily dismissed free 
speech defenses to harassment claims.22 
Thus far, this silence has not been much of a problem. As a general 
matter, in employment law, the prohibition of hostile environment 
harassment is amply justified, despite the burden on speech. Women are far 
more likely to be sexually harassed in male-dominated occupations, and 
women in nontraditional jobs quit because of sexual harassment at least 
twice as often as women in traditional jobs.23 If verbal workplace harassment 
were fully protected speech24—if, for example, pornographic photographs of 
women, or racist slogans, could be freely posted—then some workplaces 
would remain segregated, and the purposes of antidiscrimination law would 
be thwarted.25 
This logic, however, doesn’t easily transpose into public 
accommodations.26 No one’s opportunities are likely to be significantly 
19 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 19 (1993). 
20 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 389. 
21 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). 
22 See Henderson v. City of Murfreesboro, 960 F. Supp. 1292, 1299 n.10 (M.D. Tenn. 1997) 
(“[T]he majority of courts have essentially ignored the conflict between free expression and Title 
VII.”); Fallon, supra note 14, at 7–10; Schauer, supra note 16, at 356. 
23 Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation 
in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1834 
& n.328 (1990). 
24 This was advocated by Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment 
Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481, 545–46 (1991). 
25 See ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 248–54 (1996). 
26 Many defenses of hostile environment restrictions on speech are specific to the workplace. See, 
e.g., J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295 (1999); Cynthia L.
Estlund, Freedom of Expression in the Workplace and the Problem of Discriminatory Harassment,
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restricted by public accommodations that are less welcoming of some groups 
than others.27 (That might have been the case in the Deep South in 1964, but 
it is not likely to be so anywhere now.) If the extension of hostile 
environment law to public accommodations has been a mistake, it is a minor 
one. The costs of the error have thus far been low. A very thorough survey of 
hostile environment public accommodations law discovered only a few cases 
in which anything more than direct harassment of an individual was 
involved.28 
There have been a few ugly episodes of indefensible speech. For 
instance, a Massachusetts bar owner put up an African jungle display, 
including vines and stuffed monkeys, to mock Martin Luther King, Jr. and 
Black History Month.29 From the standpoint of the First Amendment, this is 
high value speech, because it addresses political issues. Had it been deemed 
protected, the bar owner could not have been fined $4500 nor required to 
take the display down.30 But episodes of this kind are rare. We could live 
with them, as we already live with other episodes of constitutionally 
protected hate speech. 
B. Hostile Environment Law (and Much Else) Violates Free Speech
There is, however, also Supreme Court authority that indicates that all
of hostile environment law—every bit of it—is unconstitutional. 
Hostile environment law is clearly content-based and hence suspect. 
In Reed v. Town of Gilbert,31 the Court made preexisting doctrine more 
75 TEX. L. REV. 687 (1997); Fallon, supra note 14, at 19–20, 43–44; Robert Post, Sexual Harassment 
and the First Amendment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 16, at 383; 
Dorothy Roberts, The Collective Injury of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LAW, supra note 16, at 365, 375–78. 
27 A New Jersey court observed: 
Public accommodations cases do not involve ongoing organizational connections or the need to 
make allowances for other special features of the employer–employee relationship, such as its 
hierarchical qualities. By the very nature of the day-to-day personal involvements which 
characterize the employment situation, a hostile working environment is a very special problem; it 
has less in common than the terms seem to convey with insulting or humiliating words or conduct 
designed to discourage a potential patron’s use of a public accommodation. 
Franek v. Tomahawk Lake Resort, 754 A.2d 1237, 1242 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000). 
28 Daniel Koontz, Hostile Public Accommodations Laws and the First Amendment, 3 N.Y.U. J. L.
& LIBERTY 197, 198–204 (2008). Some of the cases described by Koontz appear to restrict even more 
speech than workplace harassment law restricts. Harassment that is “severe or pervasive” in a hostile 
work environment claim is that which “alter[s] the conditions of the victim’s employment and create[s] 
an abusive working environment.” Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 23 (1993) (quoting 
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)). On the other hand, “a proprietor of a public 
accommodation may be found liable for discrimination based on a single insult.” Koontz, supra, at 208. 
29 Koontz, supra note 28, at 198–99, 234. 
30 Id. at 198–99. 
31 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
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rigid by categorically declaring that “regulation of speech is content based 
if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the 
idea or message expressed.”32 This implies a presumption of invalidity: “A 
law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of 
the government’s benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of 
‘animus toward the ideas contained’ in the regulated speech.”33 This works 
a revolution in free speech law, calling into question a huge range of 
government regulations, such as securities law, consumer protection, and 
professional malpractice. All of these involve the regulation of speech on 
the basis of its content. 
“The majority opinion in Reed effectively abolishes any distinction 
between content regulation and subject-matter regulation,” Judge Frank 
Easterbrook observes.34 “Any law distinguishing one kind of speech from 
another by reference to its meaning now requires a compelling 
justification.”35 If strict scrutiny is to be applied whenever a law’s 
restrictions “depend entirely on the communicative content”36 of what is 
regulated, then even contract law is presumptively invalid (it visits 
unwelcome consequences on people because of the communicative content 
of what they have signed). 
Perhaps the Court’s easygoing approval of hostile environment law in 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. has now been implicitly overruled. It is hard 
to be sure, because Reed is so wildly inconsistent with so much of existing 
law that the Court probably did not mean what it said.37 On the other hand, 
Reed has been taken very seriously by lower federal courts.38 
32 Id. at 2227. 
33 Id. at 2228 (quoting City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 429 (1993)). 
34 Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2015). 
35 Id. 
36 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227. 
37 “Robert Post, the dean of Yale Law School and an authority on free speech, said the decision 
was so bold and so sweeping that the Supreme Court could not have thought through its consequences.” 
Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech-expansion-has-far-reaching-
consequences.html [perma.cc/4FCY-TMCA]. Frederick Schauer noted, before Reed, that “the 
Securities and Exchange Commission, the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, the Office of the Register of Copyrights, 
the law of evidence, regimes of professional regulation, and quite a few other established mechanisms” 
are likely to remain undisturbed by free speech law. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First 
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1806 
(2004). It is unlikely that all this has changed. 
38 See, e.g., Cahaly v. Larosa, 796 F.3d 399, 402 (4th Cir. 2015) (invalidating anti-robocall statute); 
Dana’s R.R. Supply v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 807 F.3d 1235, 1239 (11th Cir. 2015) (invalidating law that 
prohibited merchants from imposing a surcharge on credit card purchases but that allowed discounts for 
cash). Thanks to Genevieve Lakier for the references. The wild doctrinal implications can be limited, 
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If Reed is taken seriously, then all of hostile environment law is 
unconstitutional when it is applied to speech, because it discriminates on 
the basis of viewpoint. Content-based discrimination is sometimes 
permissible if it is narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. But 
hostile environment law cannot be defended on this basis. As Justice Alito 
observed when he was a Third Circuit judge, “There is no categorical 
‘harassment exception’ to the First Amendment’s free speech clause.”39 
Hostile environment law, to the extent that the prohibited activity 
consists of speech, discriminates on the basis of viewpoint, not content.40 
The violation does not consist in speaking to or about members of 
protected classes, but rather in saying derogatory things to or about them. 
“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that 
the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because 
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”41 “Indeed, if it is the 
speaker’s opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for 
according it constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First 
Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of 
ideas.”42 
Thus, all of hostile environment law, when it is applied to speech, is 
unconstitutional under the existing doctrinal framework. The state cannot 
punish the expression of disfavored views in order to prevent the offense 
created by that expression.43 
C. Disrupting the Stalemate
Both these opposing conclusions are too crude. But they are all the 
Court has given us. As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed, 
“The Supreme Court’s offhand pronouncements are unilluminating.”44 
but in ways that are not relevant here. See Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 
129 HARV. L. REV. 1981 (2016). 
39 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 2001). 
40 See Kingsley R. Browne, The Silenced Workplace: Employer Censorship Under Title VII, in 
DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW, supra note 16, at 399, 403–04. For this reason, the Court 
cannot avoid the conclusion of unconstitutionality by manipulating strict scrutiny so that it is easy to 
satisfy, as it has done in some other recent cases. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 
(2015); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010). Viewpoint discrimination is 
categorically forbidden and cannot be justified by strict scrutiny. See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors 
of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 (1995). 
41 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989). 
42 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978) (opinion of Stevens, J.). 
43 See Koontz, supra note 28, at 211–25. 
44 DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 597 (5th Cir. 1995). See also 
Saxe, 240 F.3d at 207 (“Although the Supreme Court has written extensively on the scope of workplace 
harassment, it has never squarely addressed whether harassment, when it takes the form of pure speech, 
is exempt from First Amendment protection.”); Weller v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 84 F.3d 191, 195 
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The tension between hostile environment law and free speech has 
been apparent to scholars for some time,45 but it has not made a great deal 
of difference in practice. The collision between gay rights and religious 
conservatism may change that. 
II. THE COLLISION
A. A Political Problem and a Drafting Problem
There is now significant academic and popular literature about the 
tension between religious liberty and antidiscrimination protection for gay 
people.46 Many religious conservatives feel that it would be sinful for them 
to personally facilitate same-sex marriages,47 and they have sought to 
amend the laws to accommodate their objections. They argue, with some 
force, that there are plenty of other wedding photographers, and that 
accommodating their objections would have no significant effect on any 
gay person’s opportunities.48 
These efforts have met fierce resistance. One state’s experience is an 
illustration and a warning. In March 2015, Indiana enacted a religious 
liberty law that might have been construed to authorize a defense in such 
cases.49 In reaction against the law, thousands of businesses displayed 
n.6 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has “provid[ed] little guidance concerning whether
conduct targeted for its expressive content . . . may be regulated under Title VII”); Aguilar v. Avis Rent
A Car Sys., Inc., 980 P.2d 846, 863 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring) (“No decision by the United
States Supreme Court has, as yet, declared that the First Amendment permits restrictions on speech
creating a hostile work environment . . . .”). 
45 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 25. 
46 For examples of this, see Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-
Based Conscience Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015); Joseph William Singer, 
We Don’t Serve Your Kind Here: Public Accommodations and the Mark of Sodom, 95 B.U. L. REV. 929 
(2015); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty 
Protections, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161 (2014); and other sources collected in Andrew Koppelman, 
Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 619, 622 n.15 (2015). 
47 Their sense of being besieged is somewhat justified. See infra text accompanying notes 69–71. 
48 See Koppelman, supra note 46, at 639–44. Evidently most Americans are inclined toward 
accommodation. See Maggie Gallagher, New Poll: 80 Percent of Americans Support the Christian 
Photographer’s Right to Say “No,” THE PULSE 2016 (Aug. 6, 2015), http://thepulse2016.com/maggie-
gallagher/2015/08/06/new-poll-80-percent-of-americans-support-the-christian-photographers-right-to-
say-no/ [https://perma.cc/B6E9-P2FA] (linking to multiple polls). 
49 Tony Cook, Gov. Mike Pence Signs ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill in Private, INDIANAPOLIS STAR 
(Apr. 2, 2015, 2:34 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/03/25/gov-mike-pence-
sign-religious-freedom-bill-thursday/70448858 [https://perma.cc/45TH-R6JV]. The Indiana 
Constitution already contained religious liberty protections, but their scope was ambiguous. See Letter 
from Douglas Laycock, et al. to Brent Steele, Chair, Indiana Senate Judiciary Committee (Feb. 3, 
2015), http://www.indianahouserepublicans.com/clientuploads/PDF/RFRA.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZ63-
98G3]. 
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window stickers announcing “This business serves everyone.”50 At least ten 
national conventions—including GenCon, the world’s biggest gaming 
convention—threatened to pull out of the state, the NCAA president 
expressed doubts about keeping the organization’s headquarters in 
Indianapolis, Angie’s List canceled plans to add up to 1000 jobs in the city, 
and the CEOs of Apple and Nike condemned the law.51 Governor Mike 
Pence had been considering a bid for the Republican presidential 
nomination; the controversy ended that ambition.52 Pence quickly 
responded that the bill would be amended to clarify that it did not protect 
discrimination.53 The amendment was hastily enacted and signed into law.54 
There have been similar retreats in other states.55 Similar legislation 
seems unlikely in any state but the most conservative.56 
50 Robbie Couch, Indiana’s Anti-Gay Law Prompts Thousands of Businesses to Stand Up for 
Diversity, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2015, 3:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/30/
indiana-religious-freedom-bill_n_6969686.html [https://perma.cc/WJ3W-CDXH]. 
51 Adam Wren, The Week Mike Pence’s 2016 Dreams Crumbled, POLITICO MAGAZINE (Apr. 1, 
2015),http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/mike-pence-indiana-2016-116569.html
?ml=po#.VR1xReERGVN [https://perma.cc/VPV8-QKV8]; Jenny Che, Here Are 17 Major Companies 
Protesting States’ New Anti-Gay Laws, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 30, 2015, 1:47 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/30/businesses-protest-gay-laws_n_6969854.html 
[https://perma.cc/SVM6-NRQC]. 
52 Wren, supra note 51. 
53 Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Indiana Governor, Feeling Backlash From Law’s Opponents, 
Promises a ‘Fix,’ N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/us/politics/indiana-
governor-mike-pence-feeling-backlash-from-religious-laws-opponents-promises-a-fix.html 
[https://perma.cc/F8J9-EQAZ]. 
54 See Monica Davey, Campbell Robertson, & Richard Pérez-Peña, Indiana and Arkansas Revise 
Rights Bills, Seeking to Remove Divisive Parts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/us/indiana-arkansas-religious-freedom-bill.html 
[https://perma.cc/H59G-9PV5]. Ironically, there is still no statewide antidiscrimination protection for 
gay people in Indiana; it only exists in eleven municipalities within the state. Kristine Guerra & Tim 
Evans, RFRA Revision Does Not Widely Extend Discrimination Protections for LGBT, Experts Say, 
INDIANAPOLIS STAR (Apr. 6, 2015, 12:23 PM), http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/
04/02/yes-rfra-fix-require-christian-businesses-serve-gay-weddings/70848994/ 
[https://perma.cc/W3MA-F2SR]; LGBT Rights in Indiana, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
LGBT_rights_in_Indiana [https://perma.cc/8VRZ-NXFF]. The controversy over the religious liberty 
law has prompted a new effort to enact more local discrimination bans. Monica Davey, Gay Rights 
Battle in Indiana Moves to Local Level, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/us/gay-rights-battle-in-indiana-moves-to-local-level.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/5JKX-HBAP]. 
55 See Koppelman, supra note 46, at 631–38. 
56 Another proposal that is dead on arrival is the First Amendment Defense Act, a bill that would 
prevent the federal government from denying any benefit or tax exemption to individuals, 
organizations, or corporations because of their views on same-sex relationships. See H.R. 2802, 114th 
Cong. (2015); S. 1598, 114th Cong. (2015). Religious conservatives also failed to persuade President 
Barack Obama to include a broad exemption for religious organizations in an executive order 
prohibiting federal contractors from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation and gender 
identity. Exec. Order No. 13672, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,971 (July 21, 2014); Michelle Boorstein, Faith 
Leaders: Exempt Religious Groups From Order Barring LGBT Bias in Hiring, WASH. POST (July 2, 
2014),https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/faith-leaders-exempt-religious-groups-from-order-
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There are also technical problems with any possible legislative fix. A 
prominent proposal provides that exemption from public accommodations 
law should not be provided if “a party to the marriage is unable to 
obtain . . . similar good[s] or services . . . without substantial hardship.”57 
The requirement that the individual face “substantial hardship” is vague, 
and it is unclear whether this provision could be refined into a more 
focused rule capable of providing usable guidance. Critics have concluded 
that this drafting problem makes the proposal unworkable.58 Another 
intractable difficulty is that a drafter must decide whether an 
accommodation would cover people with religious objections to facilitating 
other categories of marriages, such as interracial marriages.59 There is no 
good answer to that question: either we declare that heterosexism is not as 
bad as racism, a result repugnant to gay rights advocates, or we license 
discrimination against interracial couples, a result repugnant to almost 
everyone. 
The basic idea is clear, however: if other providers can easily be 
found, then it would be better if the gay couples and the Christian bakers 
could be kept apart. The drafters are seeking some way to accomplish that. 
Free speech law could provide a different path to the same result.60 
B. I Didn’t Come Here to Be Insulted
I build on a suggestion by the New Mexico Supreme Court—a 
suggestion that depends on an interpretation of free speech that is doubtful, 
given the Supreme Court authority I have just reviewed. 
Several years ago, a wedding photographer in Albuquerque refused to 
take photos for a same-sex wedding, and the couple won a discrimination 
barring-lgbt-bias-in-hiring/2014/07/02/d82e68da-01f1-11e4-b8ff-89afd3fad6bd_story.html 
[https://perma.cc/648G-45SW]. 
57 See Letter from Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., Thomas C. Berg, Carl H. Esbeck, Richard 
Garnett, & Robin Fretwell Wilson to Hawaii State Sen. Rosalyn H. Baker (Oct. 17, 2013), 
mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/hawaii-special-session-letter-10-17-13-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y3W6-
J5TT]. 
58 The difficulties are explored in Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other Strangers in a Strange 
Land: The Case for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the Right of Same-Sex Couples 
to Marry, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 389, 414–22 (2010), and Mary Anne Case, Why “Live-And-Let-Live” Is 
Not a Viable Solution to the Difficult Problems of Religious Accommodation in the Age of Sexual Civil 
Rights, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 470 n.28 (2015). I acknowledge the problem in Koppelman, supra note 
46, at 639, but do not offer a solution.  
59 See Koppelman, supra note 46, at 648. 
60 The free speech argument offered here is not the one that religious conservatives have primarily 
been making, which focuses on the expressive character of certain professions, such as photography. 
For the weaknesses of that argument, see Andrew Koppelman, A Zombie in the Supreme Court: The 
Elane Photography Cert Denial, 7 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 77 (2016). 
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suit.61 The photographer’s religious accommodation claim was rejected by 
the New Mexico Supreme Court.62 The U.S. Supreme Court denied 
certiorari.63 
The New Mexico Supreme Court declared that the photographer was 
not, however, without recourse: “businesses retain their First Amendment 
rights to express their religious or political beliefs. They may, for example, 
post a disclaimer on their website or in their studio advertising that they 
oppose same-sex marriage but that they comply with applicable 
antidiscrimination laws.”64 
The New Mexico court’s suggestion offers another path to the same 
result that the “substantial hardship” proviso seeks to achieve. The 
announcement inevitably would function as a signal, and as such would 
effectively keep gay customers away, unless they have no reasonable 
alternative, without technically violating the antidiscrimination statute. If 
free speech allows Elane Photography to signal its opposition to such 
marriages, that would probably suffice to persuade gay customers—at least, 
those who are not spoiling for a fight—to look elsewhere, with no formal 
change in the antidiscrimination law. Who wants their wedding 
photographed, or their cake baked, by someone who despises the whole 
undertaking? Even if you hate that person, who wants the stress and 
expense of litigation? A business that posts such a disclaimer might never 
need to violate its conscience by facilitating same-sex marriages. 
Such a signal would also avoid the most severe injuries associated 
with discrimination.65 Gay customers reasonably do not want to be put in 
the position of seeking services and then being directly and personally told 
that they are not eligible for them. They do not want to be induced, by a 
business that holds itself out to the public and so invites them to contact it, 
to participate in the activity of their own rejection.66 The objection is 
61 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59–60 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1787 (2014). 
62 Id. at 60. 
63 Elane Photography, 134 S. Ct. 1787.  
64 Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 59. A similar, but significantly different, suggestion was later 
made by the Colorado Court of Appeals. See infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
65 For the argument that insults and harms to one’s dignity are the most severe injuries, see 
Koppelman, supra note 46, at 644–47. 
66 The prevention of this specific injury is the most sensible way to understand the “humiliation, 
frustration, and embarrassment” cited by the authors of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, who declared that 
“[t]he primary purpose of [that law was] to solve . . . the deprivation of personal dignity that surely 
accompanies denials of equal access to public establishments.” S. REP. No. 88-872, at 16 (1964), quoted 
in Carlos A. Ball, Sexuality, Third-Party Harms, and the “Live-and-Let-Live” Approach to Religious 
Exemptions, LAW, CULTURE & HUMAN., Aug. 24, 2015, at 15, http://lch.sagepub.com/
content/early/2015/08/21/1743872115601597.full.pdf+html [https://perma.cc/9RNN-GBC5]. Carlos 
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somewhat analogous to religious conservatives’ objections to participating 
in the celebration of same-sex unions. In each case, what is at issue is not 
simply the knowledge that activity is happening with which they disagree; 
it is that they are being forced to be part of that activity. That direct, 
personal insult can be more wounding to gay customers than the mere 
knowledge that there are people out there who do not want to deal with 
them. Clear signals would prevent that from happening by keeping these 
parties apart from one another. 
Of course, it may not work. The announcement may function as a 
magnet rather than a repellent, drawing gay rights activists eager to punish 
those whose views they find odious. Some people are spoiling for a fight.67 
Businesses with conservative religious views have sometimes been 
subjected to sustained attack even when they did not discriminate. In 
Indiana, a TV reporter walked into a pizzeria to ask the owners what they 
thought of the religious accommodation issue, and they indicated that they 
would not cater a gay wedding.68 They were then subjected to a flood of 
vituperation and one threat of arson, which led them to temporarily close 
the business and consider leaving the state.69 A Canadian jeweler willingly 
custom-made a pair of engagement rings for a same-sex couple, but when 
they discovered that the jeweler had publicly posted a sign saying, “The 
sanctity of marriage is under attack. Let’s keep marriage between a man 
Ball reads the prohibition of discrimination more broadly, to forbid any actions that “engender a sense 
of inferiority, vulnerability, and second-class citizenship in members of a class that . . . have been the 
victims of much discrimination and stigmatization in the past.” Id. at 16. That would arguably foreclose 
the solution suggested by the New Mexico court. 
67 It is not apparent why those who do want a fight, in this context, should have their claims 
honored by the state. This is why it would be better for an announcement of one’s opposition to same-
sex marriage to trigger an exemption in the context of public accommodations. See Koppelman, supra 
note 46, at 646–49. That, however, would require legislation of a kind unlikely to be enacted. See supra 
text accompanying notes 47–54. Such people should be regarded in the same way as those who spout 
religious bigotry: even if they are exercising a legal right, they are wrong to exercise it. Private 
conversations have persuaded me that they are so regarded by many in the gay rights leadership. 
68 Conor Friedersdorf, Should Mom-and-Pops That Forgo Gay Weddings Be Destroyed?, 
ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/should-businesses-that-
quietly-oppose-gay-marriage-be-destroyed/389489/ [https://perma.cc/MS8V-F44W]. 
69 The pizzeria eventually reopened, and some months later a gay couple took great satisfaction in 
buying two pizzas there and serving it at their wedding ceremony. Billy Hallowell, Gay Couple 
Ordered Two Large Pies From Memories Pizza. What They Did Next Is Getting a Lot of Attention., 
BLAZE (Sept. 29, 2015, 2:19 PM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/09/29/memories-pizza-said-it-
wouldnt-cater-same-sex-weddings-but-this-gay-couple-claims-they-tricked-the-shop-into-doing-just-
that/ [https://perma.cc/DNU3-RXT7]. The pizzeria owner was untroubled when he learned the truth 
about the order. “‘We weren’t catering to their wedding,’ he said. ‘They were picking [pizzas] up.’” 
Billy Hallowell, Christian Owner of Memories Pizza Responds to Claim That His Shop ‘Catered’ a Gay 
Wedding, BLAZE (Oct. 1, 2015, 10:45 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/10/01/memories-
pizza-owner-responds-to-claim-that-his-shop-catered-a-gay-wedding/ [https://perma.cc/R8Q9-S7QQ]. 
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and a woman,” the couple demanded their money back.70 After being 
inundated with hateful e-mails, phone calls, and threats, the jeweler 
complied.71 
This, however, can happen with any accommodation: even if religious 
conservatives could invoke accommodation on an ad hoc basis, as they are 
asking, the world would inevitably learn that this had happened. (Doubtless 
many are simply staying closeted, hoping that they are never put in the 
position of having to disclose their views.) Episodes where the Christian 
conservatives are subject to ugly denunciations and threats will become 
less frequent as more and more of this population is willing to make itself 
known. There is a lesson here from the history of the gay rights movement: 
as more people come out of the closet, the cost of doing so will decline. It 
is possible for a society to live with open disagreement about moral 
fundamentals. We are already doing that with respect to abortion. Those 
with pro-life or pro-choice views are not often subjected to this kind of 
mistreatment. 
Whatever the consequences, dissenters from a regime of gay equality 
must be allowed to speak when they are willing to bear the social costs of 
doing so, because any legitimate regime must protect dissent.72 Some gay 
rights supporters will worry about the danger that allowing this speech will 
trigger a cascade of similar speech that legitimates these views. That people 
will be persuaded by bad ideas is, however, a perennial danger of free 
speech. 
Finally, this solution, based in the Constitution, would require no new 
legislation. Given the present state of political paralysis, that is a big 
advantage. Constitutional law is not contingent on politics, and free speech 
law, in fact, has managed to protect some very unpopular speech. 
Because no legislative language need be agreed upon, it would not be 
necessary to work out the intractable question, unlikely to arise often in 
practice but radioactive as an abstract principle, of whether an 
accommodation would equally extend to religious opposition to interracial 
70 Rod Dreher, Heads LGBTs Win, Tails Christians Lose, AM. CONSERVATIVE (May 21, 2015, 5:15 
PM), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/dreher/heads-lgbt-win-tails-christians-lose/ 
[https://perma.cc/WY5R-DKE5]; Jewelry Store Sign Prompts Same-Sex Couple to Ask for Refund, CBC 
NEWS (May 16, 2015, 7:30 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/newfoundland-labrador/jewelry-store-
sign-prompts-same-sex-couple-to-ask-for-refund-1.3077192 [https://perma.cc/H2AT-D2V7]. 
71 Dreher, supra note 70; Jewelry Store Sign Prompts Same-Sex Couple to Ask for Refund, supra 
note 70. 
72 See generally STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 87–
109 (1990). The point is developed, with specific reference to the gay rights issue, in Nan D. Hunter, 
Pluralism and Its Perils: Navigating the Tension Between Gay Rights and Religious Expression, 
15 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 435 (2014). 
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marriages. Free speech already resolves this question, on the side of 
equivalence: citizens have a right to express their disapproval of both kinds 
of marriages. 
But it is not clear that constitutional law is reliable in this context. As 
we have seen, the pertinent doctrine is confused. 
C. Legal Limits on Signaling
The New Mexico court does not notice that this accommodation might 
require modification of the law of harassment. Illinois is not the only state 
that might treat this kind of disclaimer as creating an actionable hostile 
environment.73 Eight other states and the District of Columbia also 
specifically prohibit announcements that a protected class of customers 
(such as gay customers) is unwelcome.74 Others construe their general 
antidiscrimination laws to bar such hostile environments in places of public 
accommodation.75 It is not necessary to construe these statutes to reach 
speech, since hostile environments can be created in many other ways.76 
73 See Koontz, supra note 28, at 198–204; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Cyberspace, 
Harassment Law, and the Clinton Administration, 63 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 299, 318–26 (2000). 
There is no clear authority on whether New Mexico is one of those states. 
74 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4504 (2013); D.C. CODE 
§ 2-1401.01 (2014); 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102 (2015); ME. STAT. tit. 5, §§ 4552, 4591–92 (2007);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 272, § 98 (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:16 (1998); N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§ 296 (McKinney 2016); 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-1 (2016); WISC. STAT. § 106.52 (2015). The
statutes of five more states have similar language barring communications indicating that protected
groups are unwelcome, but do not include sexual orientation as a forbidden basis of discrimination.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.230 (2015); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.140 (West 1992); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-304 (2015); 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. § 955 (West 2015); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9 (2015).
Similarly, the federal Fair Housing Act does not permit property owners “[t]o make, print, or
publish . . . any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that 
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap, 
familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012). First Amendment challenges to this 
provision have been rejected because the speech in question threatens illegal conduct, and because it is 
commercial speech, which has a reduced level of protection. See Ragin v. N.Y. Times Co., 923 F.2d 
995, 1002 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212–13 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
409 U.S. 934 (1972). Neither of these is true of the announcement contemplated by the New Mexico 
court. The Fourth Circuit construed the statute only to reach commercial speech: “paid advertisements 
which communicate grievances, protest claimed abuses, seek financial aid for a cause, or engage in 
other protected expressions are not restrained by the Act.” Hunter, 459 F.2d at 211 n.6.  
75 See generally Koontz, supra note 28, at 198–204 (reporting, inter alia, cases from states not 
included in supra note 69). It is doubtful whether the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can be construed to 
cover retail stores, bakeries, or photographers. See Joseph William Singer, supra note 46, at 942; 
42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012) (mandating equal access to “lodgings; facilities principally engaged in selling 
food for consumption on the premises; gasoline stations; places of exhibition or entertainment; other 
covered establishments”). 
 The recently introduced Equality Act of 2015, which would add sexual orientation to the 
discriminations barred by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, also clarifies that the Act covers “any 
establishment that provides a good, service, or program, including a store, shopping center, online 
retailer or service provider, salon, bank, gas station, food bank, service or care center, shelter, travel 
agency, or funeral parlor, or establishment that provides health care, accounting, or legal services.” S. 
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Businesses are prohibited from announcing their intention to 
discriminate. The validity of that prohibition is not in doubt, because 
discrimination is illegal, and threats to engage in illegal conduct are not 
protected speech.77 The prohibition could, however, be construed to bar 
business people not only from posting signs like the ones described by the 
New Mexico court, but also from giving interviews and otherwise 
publicizing their reservations about facilitating same-sex marriages. That 
would produce a situation like that of Chick-fil-A, described at the 
beginning of this Article. 
The limits on signaling that can be created by hostile environment law 
are apparent in the Colorado Court of Appeals’ explanation, in another 
bakery case, of the options. The story that the Colorado court tells is 
significantly different from New Mexico’s: 
[The discrimination statute] does not preclude Masterpiece from expressing its 
views on same-sex marriage—including its religious opposition to it—and the 
bakery remains free to disassociate itself from its customers’ viewpoints. We 
recognize that section 24-34-601(2)(a) of CADA prohibits Masterpiece from 
displaying or disseminating a notice stating that it will refuse to provide its 
services based on a customer’s desire to engage in same-sex marriage or 
indicating that those engaging in same-sex marriage are unwelcome at the 
bakery. However, CADA does not prevent Masterpiece from posting a 
disclaimer in the store or on the Internet indicating that the provision of its 
services does not constitute an endorsement or approval of conduct protected 
by CADA. Masterpiece could also post or otherwise disseminate a message 
indicating that CADA requires it not to discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation and other protected characteristics. Such a message would likely 
have the effect of disassociating Masterpiece from its customers’ conduct.78 
The Colorado opinion carefully leaves ambiguous the crucial question 
of whether the bakery could signal its opposition to same-sex marriage. 
1858, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015). If it became law, the conflict between gay 
rights and religious liberty would become more salient, and the need to clarify the free speech question 
more urgent. 
76 For example, a business may treat black customers worse than white customers without refusing 
service altogether. See, e.g., Brooks v. Collis Foods, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1347–48 (N.D. Ga. 
2005). 
77 See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388–89 
(1973); Eugene Volokh, Why May the Government Ban Businesses from Saying “We Won’t Bake Cakes 
for Same-Sex Weddings”?, WASH. POST (July 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2015/07/06/why-may-the-government-ban-businesses-from-saying-we-wont-bake-
cakes-for-same-sex-weddings/ [https://perma.cc/Y3J7-3F2K]. Thus, the Court has observed that the 
prohibition of discrimination can prevent employers from posting signs saying “White Applicants 
Only.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 (2006). 
78 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 288 (Colo. App. 2015) (footnote omitted) 
(citing Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980)), cert. denied, 2016 WL 1645027 
(Colo. 2016), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights 
Comm’n (U.S. July 25, 2016) (No. 16-111). 
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The New Mexico court contemplated that the photographer could “post a 
disclaimer on their website or in their studio advertising that they oppose 
same-sex marriage but that they comply with applicable antidiscrimination 
laws.”79 Such a disclaimer, however, might violate Colorado’s prohibition 
on indicating that those participating in same-sex marriage are unwelcome. 
So instead the bakery can only offer a bland generic statement that it is 
required to obey the law. That would considerably blunt the effectiveness 
of the signal. Gay people would still walk into these businesses, with bad 
consequences for the gay people, the businesses, or both. 
D. The Sweet Cakes Order
If courts consider only the imperatives of antidiscrimination law, and 
are oblivious of the free speech issues, the consequences for speech are 
likely to be pretty bad. 
The problem was starkly presented in an Oregon case in which a 
bakery, Sweet Cakes by Melissa, was assessed $135,000 in damages for 
emotional suffering after it refused to bake a cake for a same-sex 
wedding.80 The final order by the Commissioner of the Oregon Bureau of 
Labor and Industries appropriately found liability, but it also banned 
notices of intent to discriminate, pursuant to a state statute that specifically 
banned such notices.81 This would have been correct with respect to plain 
notices that some customers are unwelcome, such as an earlier Oregon case 
involving a tavern’s posting that read “NO SHOES SHIRTS SERVICE 
NIGGERS.”82 The Oregon order, however, declared that the bakery had 
made such an announcement by more general statements such as “This 
fight is not over. We will continue to stand strong,” made in the context of 
ongoing litigation.83 The Commissioner’s strained interpretation leaves 
79 Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 
(2014).  
80 In re Klein, Case Nos. 44-14 & 45-14, at 42–43 (Ore. Bur. Lab. & Indus. July 2, 2015), 
http://www.oregon.gov/boli/SiteAssets/pages/press/Sweet%20Cakes%20FO.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7859-4W37] [hereinafter Klein final order]. 
81 Id. at 22–26. 
82 In the Matter of John W. Masepohl, dba the Pub, 6 BOLI 270, 273 (Ore. Bur. Lab. & Indus. June 
24, 1987). A more difficult free speech problem was a sign on the same tavern saying “VIVA 
APARTHEID.” Id. The Commissioner recognized this as “pure political speech,” which “is accorded 
the utmost deference,” but held that it violated the statute because in context it “clearly communicate[d] 
that services within would be refused, withheld, denied, or that discrimination would be made on the 
bases of race.” Id. at 281–82 (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)).  
83 Klein final order, supra note 80, at 27. 
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doubt as to whether a disclaimer such as the one described by the New 
Mexico court would have been deemed to violate the statute or the order.84 
The First Amendment had better have something to say about an 
agency’s order that its adversary in litigation must not criticize the agency’s 
own conduct. The order, in context, implies that any statement of 
disagreement with the agency’s interpretation of its powers or with the 
state’s antidiscrimination laws will be construed as an illegal threat to 
violate those laws. A statement of generalized opposition to same-sex 
marriage could be construed the same way. 
No surprise here: many local officials evidently do not understand free 
speech law; they routinely enact speech-suppressing laws that are 
obviously unconstitutional, and courts routinely strike them down.85 It is in 
those cases that the rules laid down by the Supreme Court prove their 
usefulness. They give the lower courts clear marching orders. 
With the law of hostile environment, however, there is no clarity. The 
Court has decided that a wink and a nudge will do. In a different way, the 
Colorado court also permits that: maybe customers will know what a 
business means when it says that the law requires it not to discriminate. 
That works only if everyone understands what the winks and nudges 
signify. 
In this context, we need more law. 
III. THE ARTHRITIC FIRST AMENDMENT
Commentators who have confronted the tension between harassment 
law and free speech have almost all concluded that a new, narrowly 
bounded exception to free speech protection for workplace harassment is 
justified. Daniel Koontz, for example, proposes that a new exception to free 
speech protection should be created for public accommodations, allowing 
restriction only when: 
(1) The proprietor or employee of the public accommodation speaks
directly and specifically to a member of a protected class, as
opposed to the public at large;
84 See Ken White, Lawsplainer: So Are Those Christian Cake-Bakers In Oregon Unconstitutionally 
Gagged, Or Not?, POPEHAT (July 8, 2015), http://popehat.com/2015/07/08/lawsplainer-so-are-those-
christian-cake-bakers-in-oregon-unconstitutionally-gagged-or-not/ [https://perma.cc/LN97-3K3T]. The 
Commissioner is on firmer ground when he says that the bakery violated the law when it told the 
couple, “[W]e don’t do same-sex marriage, same-sex wedding cakes.” Id. (quoting Klein final order, 
supra note 80, which in turn cited a radio interview). This was a statement to a single couple, included 
as part of a historical narrative of the transaction, but it indicated future intentions and was never 
disavowed. 
85 See Adam Winkler, Free Speech Federalism, 108 MICH. L. REV. 153, 154–55 (2009). 
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(2) The speech would cause a reasonable member of the protected
category to believe that the proprietor did not want to extend to him
or her full and equal enjoyment of the accommodation as a result of
his or her membership in that protected category; and
(3) The totality of the circumstances indicates that the proprietor’s
offensive statements are motivated by a desire to exclude the patron
because of the patron’s membership in a protected category.86
The free speech attractions of this exception are clear.87 It would mean 
that a proprietor has a right to speak to the public through its business, 
which is probably the most effective means of communication that a small 
business owner has at her disposal. This formulation also vindicates the 
most exigent concerns of antidiscrimination law by barring specific 
mistreatment, including verbal mistreatment, of members of protected 
classes, and banning announcements of intention to illegally discriminate, 
such as “Whites Only” signs. 
As we have seen, it also largely avoids the gay rights–conservative 
religion collision. By enabling religious businesses to signal their views on 
same-sex marriage, it reduces to the vanishing point the likelihood that 
those businesses will ever be asked by gay customers to do what their 
conscience forbids. 
This solution is, however, foreclosed by the Court’s declaration that it 
will craft no new exceptions to free speech protection.88 The consequence 
86 Koontz, supra note 28, at 231. Koontz is, to my knowledge, the only scholar who has proposed 
an exception specifically tailored for public accommodations. For other writers who have proposed 
similarly nuanced exceptions for the workplace, see GREENAWALT, supra note 15; Balkin, supra note 
26; Estlund, supra note 26; Fallon, supra note 14; Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and Free Speech: The 
First Amendment Is Not Hostile to a Content-Neutral Hostile-Environment Theory, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 
227; Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1791 (1992). 
The exception is Browne, supra note 24. Browne would categorically bar admission of any evidence of 
speech in discrimination cases.  
87 They are so clear that Eugene Volokh has proposed the same distinction be drawn as a general 
free speech matter, so that even in the workplace, speech not directed at a particular person, such as 
words and pictures on walls and bulletin boards, would be protected. Eugene Volokh, One-to-One 
Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and “Cyberstalking,” 107 NW. U. L. 
REV. 731, 738 (2013); Volokh, supra note 86, at 1843–71. In light of the exclusionary effect of hostile 
environments in the workplace, this goes too far. See supra text accompanying notes 23–25. But the 
arguments for restricting one-to-many speech are persuasive only in the workplace, not in other 
contexts, such as public accommodations. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28. In those contexts, 
Volokh is right. Even if one were to extend the logic to public accommodations, liability should be 
limited, as Charles Calleros has suggested, to “speech which is obviously discriminatory, severely 
disturbing, and unavoidably and pervasively within the view of unwilling audiences.” Charles R. 
Calleros, Title VII and the First Amendment: Content-Neutral Regulation, Disparate Impact, and the 
“Reasonable Person,” 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1274 (1997). The kind of notice contemplated by the 
New Mexico court does not rise to this level. 
88 United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010). For further critique of Stevens, see Andrew 
Koppelman, Revenge Pornography and First Amendment Exceptions, 65 EMORY L.J. 661, 672–77 
(2016). 
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of that decision is to freeze free speech law in a way that is not even good 
for the protection of speech. I have already noted the Court’s contradictory 
approach to the free speech harassment question. The state of free speech 
law is, in fact, even worse than I have thus far shown, because the Court 
has blocked the most attractive way out of the tangle. 
In United States v. Stevens,89 in which the Court invalidated a law 
criminalizing depictions of the illegal killing of animals, Chief Justice 
Roberts announced that there would henceforth be no new categories of 
unprotected speech: 
The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to 
categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs 
and benefits. The First Amendment itself reflects a judgment by the American 
people that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the 
costs. Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to revise that judgment simply 
on the basis that some speech is not worth it. The Constitution is not a 
document “prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at 
pleasure.”90 
Every established exception to free speech protection, Chief Justice 
Roberts declared, is based upon “a previously recognized, long-established 
category of unprotected speech.”91 Before speech can be regulated, the state 
must show a “long-settled tradition of subjecting that speech to 
regulation.”92 There is no tradition of regulating dogfighting videos, so the 
Court invalidated a law that criminalized them.93 
By this logic, the prohibition of speech that creates a hostile 
environment, in the workplace or in public accommodations, must also be 
“presumptively invalid” because it “explicitly regulates expression based 
on content.”94 The speech that generates the hostile environment (for 
example, the notice contemplated by the New Mexico court) often consists 
of truthful information about what the proprietor of the establishment 
believes about the protected group. It is objectionable only because of the 
viewpoint it conveys. Viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional. 
Stevens misrepresents the history of speech regulation in the United 
States. The idea of categories of low-value speech is an invention of the 
89 559 U.S. at 481–82 (2010).  
90 Id. at 470 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803)). 
91 Id. at 471. 
92 Id. at 469. 
93 Id. at 481–82. The Court relied on the same logic (and cited Stevens) in invalidating a ban on the 
sale of violent video games to minors in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 
2734, 2742 (2011). 
94 See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468. See also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015), quoted 
supra text accompanying notes 31–33. 
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Court that has been developed since the 1940s. The history the Court 
deems dispositive is a history that does not exist.95 The decision about what 
kind of speech is unprotected, embodied in present doctrine, cannot be 
attributed to “a judgment by the American people,” as Stevens asserts.96 At 
the time of the First Amendment’s enactment, there was remarkably little 
reflection about what it would mean in practice.97 That task has been left to 
judges. Modern free speech law is a product of common law development, 
not of text.98 
A better account of First Amendment exceptions has been offered by 
Kagan, in an article written before she became a judge. Justice Kagan 
observes that the lack of protection for some kinds of speech represents a 
contestable value judgment, and may even involve viewpoint 
discrimination.99 The category of unprotected obscenity, for example, 
restricts “a single (disfavored) viewpoint about sexual matters,” and 
“invokes community standards of offensiveness.”100 The viewpoint 
discrimination rests on the view that “only the restricted ideas cause great 
harms and have sparse value.”101 Nonetheless, “partly because of the long-
established nature of the category, such regulation may give rise to fewer 
concerns of compromising First Amendment principles.”102 Slippery slope 
and chilling effect arguments are predictive. If the prediction has been 
falsified by experience, then these concerns are ameliorated. “A long 
tradition of regulating a particular category of low value speech,” a law 
95 See generally Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 2166 
(2015).  
96 559 U.S. at 470. 
97 See LEONARD W. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985).  
98 See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 51–76 (2010). 
99 Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First 
Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413 (1996). 
100 Id. at 473 n.166. 
101 Elena Kagan, Regulation of Hate Speech and Pornography After R.A.V., 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 
873, 899 (1993). 
102 Id. at 897. Kagan, as Solicitor General, proposed the balancing test that was rejected by the 
Court in Stevens. The difference between Justice Kagan’s article and her position in her brief for the 
United States is that in the latter, she did not even concede a strong presumption against new categories. 
Instead, she declared that speech can be regulated on the basis of its content whenever “the First 
Amendment value of the speech is ‘clearly outweighed’ by its societal costs.” Brief for the United 
States at 12, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 1615365, at *12 
(quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). The explanation of the difference 
could be the breadth of the statute she was obligated to defend. The law was so loosely worded that it 
prohibited films of hunting and bullfighting, and documentaries designed to document the mistreatment 
of animals. Stevens, 559 U.S. at 477–82. She may have judged that only a broad balancing test could 
sustain that statute. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, she endorsed a milder proposition: “We can administer 
our content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common sense, so as to leave standing laws that in no 
way implicate its intended function.” 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  
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professors’ brief in Stevens observed, “creates a historical understanding of 
the contours and definition of the category and demonstrates from 
experience that the category can be regulated without doing undue damage 
to the First Amendment.”103 The Stevens Court cited “historic and 
traditional categories long familiar to the bar,”104 but it took the existence of 
these as evidence for its bogus historical narrative when it is really just an 
aid to judicial construction. 
If that is the case, however, then the Stevens Court was wrong to 
disclaim “a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech 
outside the scope of the First Amendment.”105 The Court has always had, 
and has often exercised, that authority. The question is how it ought to 
exercise it. The Court may reasonably be “reluctant to mark off new 
categories of speech for diminished constitutional protection,” reflecting 
“skepticism about the possibility of courts drawing principled distinctions 
to use in judging governmental restrictions on speech and ideas.”106 A 
presumption, however, is not the same as a rigid rule. 
It is puzzling why the Stevens Court declared the shape of the law 
fixed for all time and then attributed that decision to the Framers. None of 
the briefs, not even the ones that directly attacked the government’s 
proposed balancing test,107 proposed anything as wooden and ahistorical as 
that. If the question is whether a given exception is consistent with the 
purposes of free speech, then hostile environment law generally presents no 
problem, because it has not, in fact, had any severe effect on speech. Until 
now. And now that the problem has arisen, the Court is curiously disabled 
from being helpful. 
103 Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars Bruce Ackerman et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 6, Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460 (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 2331222, at *5–6.  
104 Stevens, 559 U.S. at 468 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime 
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)).  
105 Id. at 472. 
106 Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 804–05 (1996) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part).  
107 In addition to Ackerman, see Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Respondent at 16–27, United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 2331221, 
at *16–28; Brief of the DKT Liberty Project, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the Center for 
Democracy and Technology, as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 4–13, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 
(2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 2247129, at *4–13; Brief of First Amendment Lawyers Association as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent at 9–10, 15–18, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769), 
2009 WL 2331224, at *9–10, *15–18; Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Publishers, Inc. 
et al. in Support of Respondent at 11, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769), 2009 WL 2331225, at 
*11; Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press and Thirteen News
Media Organizations in Support of Respondent at 20–22, Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (No. 08-769),
2009 WL 2219305, at *20–22. 
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Free speech law is intentionally inflexible. It is a body of law based on 
rules rather than standards, precluding decisionmakers from considering all 
the relevant interests in a decision.108 That is important in contexts in which 
judges are likely to err in favor of suppression at the same time that other 
state actors are making similar mistakes, creating a general climate of fear 
that chills public discussion.109 It does not, however, justify the Court in self-
calcification, blinding itself to consequences at the architectonic level.110 
The Court’s ringing defense of free speech paradoxically results in 
less speech protection. It means that the only way in which the Court can 
allow hostile environment law to operate—and the Court has clearly 
indicated that it will allow it—is to pretend (as it did in Harris v. Forklift 
Systems, Inc.) that it presents no free speech issue at all. That authorizes 
preposterous results such as the Oregon decision. It might even permit the 
suit against Chick-fil-A to go forward. 
IV. SOME NEGLECTED PURPOSES OF FREE SPEECH
Justice Elena Kagan has suggested that the increasingly rigid free 
speech doctrine should be administered “with a dose of common sense, so 
as to leave standing laws that in no way implicate its intended function.”111 
What is that function? 
One obvious problem with a restriction of a business’s capacity to 
announce its disagreement with antidiscrimination law is that this interferes 
with political speech. The Court has repeatedly said that political speech is 
at the core of free speech protection.112 The baker or florist is obeying the 
law under protest. It will act as the law demands it act, but it regards the 
108 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-
BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 77–78 (1991); Frederick Schauer, The Second-Best 
First Amendment, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 9–11 (1989). 
109 The germinal thinker on this point is Thomas Emerson, who called for categorical free speech 
rules in response to the specific experience of suppression during the McCarthy era. See Andrew 
Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism in Free Speech Theory, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 647, 
704–06 (2013).  
110 See Koppelman, supra note 109, at 704–06. 
111 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2238 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring in the judgment). 
112 See, e.g., Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52 (1982) (“At the core of the First Amendment are 
certain basic conceptions about the manner in which political discussion in a representative democracy 
should proceed.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)) (“[T]he central purpose of the Speech and Press Clauses was 
to assure a society in which ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ public debate concerning matters of 
public interest would thrive, for only in such a society can a healthy representative democracy 
flourish.”). Both of these cases were quoted with approval in Knox v. Service Employees International 
Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2288 (2012).  
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law as wrong and wants to make that fact known. That is political speech 
under even the most parsimonious definition of the term.113  
However, hostile environment law does not target political speech. 
Much of free speech law is primarily concerned with illegitimate 
government purpose. Many of its objective tests are proxies for detecting 
those purposes.114 The paradigmatic wrong, for the political understanding 
of free speech, is the suppression of speech in order to safeguard 
incumbents from political challenge. Harassment law does not do that. One 
might infer that it is appropriate to draw the line where the Colorado court 
drew it:115 you can publicize your views, but not in a way that will make 
employees or prospective customers feel unwelcome. 
There is, however, a second specific purpose that free speech deems 
beyond the pale: the aim of protecting citizens from the specific offense of 
discovering that some of their fellow citizens despise what they hold 
sacred. The free speech tradition is not only concerned about politics. The 
offense that hostile environment law tries to prevent in this context is a 
kind of offense that free speech law demands that we tolerate. The harm 
here is of the same kind as the harm caused by heretical or blasphemous 
speech. 
Long before James Madison argued that democracy logically entailed 
the freedom to criticize incumbent officeholders,116 the principal focus of 
arguments against censorship was the prohibition of heresy and blasphemy. 
Free speech and freedom of religion were not always in separate analytical 
silos. In Reformation Europe, religious diversity was fundamentally about 
the embrace of different theological propositions. John Milton, no 
democrat—he was an enthusiastic functionary of the military dictator 
Oliver Cromwell117—claimed, in his 1644 essay Areopagitica, that 
government had no business policing arguments about religious truth.118 
The focus on political speech is a late addition to a tradition that was at 
least 150 years old when Madison wrote. 
113 See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 
27–28 (1971) (arguing that, because the function of the free speech guarantee is to protect political 
discussion, “[t]he category of protected speech should consist of speech concerned with governmental 
behavior, policy or personnel, whether the governmental unit involved is executive, legislative, judicial 
or administrative”). 
114 See generally Kagan, supra note 99. 
115 See supra text accompanying notes 78–79. 
116 James Madison, Republican Manifesto: The Virginia Report, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER:
SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 229, 243 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 
1981). 
117 CHRISTOPHER HILL, MILTON AND THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 165–86 (1977). 
118 JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR PROSE 716 (Merritt Y. Hughes 
ed., 1957) (1644). 
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Too much free speech theory supposes that there must be a single 
unifying reason for protecting speech. (A number of single unifying 
reasons—democracy, the search for truth, individual self-realization—are 
on offer in the literature.) Rather, freedom of speech is an ongoing practice 
that has had a large range of justifications and effects.119 Any of those 
effects, if people value it, can generate another kind of justification. Courts 
rely on the justifications that make sense to them when they construe 
constitutional principles. 
Here I note a cluster of three related free speech goals. One is, what 
Milton advocated, the promotion of dissenting speech that is broadly 
“religious,” concerned about the final ends that people ought to pursue.120 
This, not political speech, is the primitive core of the right to free speech. 
Constitutional provisions should be read in light of the specific evils that 
they were originally intended to prevent.121 
I am not claiming that the religious character of speech should be 
relevant to the analysis of whether it is legally protected.122 Rather, the 
religious provenance of free speech helps to show why the harm associated 
with heresy and blasphemy—harm not obviously associated with electoral 
democracy—is a kind of harm that cannot justify restrictions on speech. In 
a regime of free speech, we must learn to live with others whose 
understanding of ultimate values is radically at odds with, and offensive to, 
our own. 
A second important value is mutual transparency. Recent work on the 
cultural specificity of ideals of free speech, and their roots in dissenting 
Protestantism, raises the question whether the idea of free speech has 
anything to offer non-Western civilizations.123 Democracy provides a 
familiar answer: authoritarian government has the same pathologies 
everywhere, and official accountability is impossible without free speech. 
But another is the opportunity free speech provides to close the “gulf that 
separates class from class and soul from soul,”124 as Shaw’s Henry Higgins 
put it. Seana Shiffrin argues that, “given that our minds are not directly 
accessible to one another, speech and expression are the only precise 
119 See Koppelman, supra note 109, at 687–91. 
120 This one has not been entirely neglected. See Douglas Laycock, Freedom of Speech That Is 
Both Religious and Political, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 793, 793–95 (1996). 
121 JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
(2001); Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1917, 1923–25 (2012).  
122 Thanks to Marty Redish for demanding clarification of this point. 
123 See, e.g., JOHN DURHAM PETERS, COURTING THE ABYSS: FREE SPEECH AND THE LIBERAL
TRADITION (2005).  
124 Bernard Shaw, Pygmalion, in 1 COMPLETE PLAYS WITH PREFACES 197, 248 (1962). 
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avenues by which one can be known as the individual one is by others.”125 
Censorship enacts “a sort of solitary confinement outside of prison but 
within one’s mind.”126 Because free communication is essential to avoid 
this pathology, it is a fundamental human right.127 
The third is that free speech welcomes, what many people will find 
troubling, the open collision of moral views. When John Stuart Mill’s 
classic defense of free speech balances liberty against harm, Jeremy 
Waldron has observed, that balancing cannot count as harm the moral 
distress of having your most cherished views denounced, or of 
contemplating ways of life antithetical to your own.128 A core value of free 
speech is that it will and must induce such distress. Mill, and liberalism 
more generally, place great value on “ethical confrontation—the open 
clash between earnestly held ideals and opinions about the nature and basis 
of the good life.”129 Moral distress, “far from being a legitimate ground for 
interference . . . is a positive and healthy sign that the processes of ethical 
confrontation that Mill called for are actually taking place.”130 Part of the 
reason for protecting illiberal ideas is that they promise to induce that 
distress.131 
The gay rights movement has benefited from all three aspects of free 
speech. It was permitted, by free speech law, to disseminate views that 
were almost universally regarded as so offensive to religious sensibilities as 
to be intolerable.132 It permitted gay people to escape that societal 
institution of solitary confinement familiarly called “the closet.”133 It was 
allowed with impunity to provoke enormous moral distress in its 
adversaries. 
This valorization of moral distress is not peculiar to Mill. It is a central 
part of the free speech tradition. John Durham Peters observes that, since 
Milton, the ideology of free speech has celebrated the ability to encounter 
125 SEANA VALENTINE SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 88–89 
(2014).  
126 Id. at 91. 
127 Id. at 117. 
128 See Jeremy Waldron, Mill and the Value of Moral Distress, in LIBERAL RIGHTS: COLLECTED 
PAPERS 1981–1991, at 115 (1993).  
129 Id. at 120. 
130 Id. at 125. Waldron’s more recent call for restriction of hate speech is in tension with this 
argument. See Andrew Koppelman, Waldron, Responsibility-Rights, and Hate Speech, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1201, 1215–21 (2011). 
131 This is one reason why the protection of dissent is so central to the free speech tradition. See 
generally SHIFFRIN, supra note 72. 
132 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 93–
96, 116–23 (1999). 
133 Id. at 123–25. 
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evil ideas and come away unscathed: “Satan represents a key figure in the 
dramatis personae of free expression, the troublemaker who nonetheless 
brings about, by the very force of his negativity, good in the end.”134 
Pornographers, Nazis, and other transgressors of the sacred thus form a 
stable alliance with civil libertarians. Peters emphasizes the cultural 
peculiarity of this valorization of “sponsoring study-abroad sojourns in the 
land of fire and brimstone.”135 Most cultures “do not train souls for the 
ironic contortionism that liberal subjectivity calls for.”136 Rather, most of 
the world’s population “cannot hear certain things without wanting to hit 
somebody.”137 
The three purposes are parts of a coherent whole. 
What does it mean to seek transparency—to reveal oneself to others? 
We define our identities in terms of concerns that are deeper than our mere 
preferences that respond to demands that emanate from beyond 
ourselves.138 Charles Taylor writes: 
To know who I am is a species of knowing where I stand. My identity is 
defined by the commitments and identifications which provide the frame or 
horizon within which I can try to determine from case to case what is good, or 
valuable, or what ought to be done, or what I endorse or oppose. In other 
words, it is the horizon within which I am capable of taking a stand.139 
Self-disclosure is disclosure of what matters to me, what I care about 
deeply.140 That is why I reveal something important about myself (and 
make myself vulnerable) when I share with you a book or poem that moves 
me. It is also why the protection of heresy and blasphemy—unorthodox 
ideas about the most urgent human concerns—is closely tied to the value of 
transparency. 
134 PETERS, supra note 123, at 84. 
135 Id. at 14. 
136 Id. at 93. 
137 Id. It is, on the other hand, possible to take pleasure in encountering the remarkable variety of 
humanity, and that pleasure is not confined to Western culture. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND 
THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 226–56 (1990). 
138 See CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETHICS OF AUTHENTICITY 31–41 (1991). 
139 CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY 27 (1989). 
A related indicator of identity is what a person will not do under any circumstances. Harry Frankfurt 
writes: “As the set of its essential characteristics specifies the limits of what a triangle can be, so does 
the set of actions that are unthinkable for a person specify the limits of what the person can will to do. It 
defines his essence as a volitional creature.” Harry G. Frankfurt, Rationality and the Unthinkable, in 
THE IMPORTANCE OF WHAT WE CARE ABOUT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 177, 188 (1988). A person who 
will do anything if the price is right has only accidental characteristics; he has no stable identity at all. 
See Harry G. Frankfurt, Autonomy, Necessity, and Love, in NECESSITY, VOLITION, AND LOVE 129, 138–
39 (1999). The relation between Frankfurt’s and Taylor’s orientation in moral space should be obvious. 
140 “[T]he things that we love tell us what we are.” THOMAS MERTON, THOUGHTS IN SOLITUDE 10 
(1958). 
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On one of the few occasions when the Court has tried to define 
“religion,” it quoted with approval David Saville Muzzey’s definition of 
religion as “the devotion of man to the highest ideal that he can conceive,” 
and Paul Tillich’s description of God as “the depths of your life, of the 
source of your being, of your ultimate concern, of what you take seriously 
without any reservation.”141 Religious speech in this broad sense is speech 
about our orientation in what Taylor calls “moral space, a space in which 
questions arise about what is good or bad, what is worth doing and what 
not, what has meaning and importance for you and what is trivial and 
secondary.”142 Claims about our appropriate orientation in moral space then 
should be understood as a central object of free speech protection.143 
Of course, often there is no joy in discovering what others really think 
of the gods we worship. It is much more comfortable to delude ourselves 
with the thought that everyone basically agrees with us about these 
fundamentals.144 The suppression of blasphemy and heresy thus encourages 
a kind of solipsism.145 If we are going to have transparency, if we are to 
escape the solitary confinement of our own minds, then we are going to 
have to learn to live with moral confrontation. 
Antidiscrimination law is in some tension with all three of these 
values. 
It aims to limit diversity of opinion by guaranteeing that traditionally 
stigmatized groups need not be branded with inferior social status. Its 
ultimate purpose is to eradicate racism, sexism, and other ideologies that 
regard some citizens as inferior and degraded.146 
That means that it must aspire to limit the transparency of minds. If 
you regard your black employees or customers as members of an inferior 
141 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 183, 187 (1965) (first quoting DAVID SAVILLE MUZZEY,
ETHICS AS A RELIGION 95 (1951); and then quoting PAUL TILLICH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 
57 (1948)). The Court was pushed toward this abstract characterization by the country’s growing 
religious diversity, which confounds more theistic definitions. See Andrew Koppelman, The Story of 
Welsh v. United States: Elliott Welsh’s Two Religious Tests, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 293 
(Richard W. Garnett and Andrew Koppelman, eds., 2012).  
142 Taylor, supra note 139, at 28. 
143 It is also an indispensable precursor of any political decision, and so should be protected by any 
Madisonian argument for protecting speech. See Andrew Koppelman, Madisonian Pornography or, The 
Importance of Jeffrey Sherman, 84 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 597 (2009). 
144 Iris Murdoch argued that the “chief enemy” of morality is “personal fantasy: the tissue of self-
aggrandizing and consoling wishes and dreams which prevents one from seeing what is there outside 
one.” IRIS MURDOCH, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD 57 (1971). Censorship fosters such fantasy by 
blocking our access to other minds. 
145 On the relation of censorship and solipsism, see Andrew Koppelman, Another Solipsism: Rae 
Langton on Sexual Fantasy, 5 WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 163 (2013). 
146 See generally Koppelman, supra note 25. 
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race, or your female ones as silly trivial creatures who are of value only as 
sex toys, shut up. Keep that to yourself. We do not want to hear it. 
Constant moral distress can create a hostile environment. Justice 
Ginsburg observes that the ban on sex discrimination is violated when 
“members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of 
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed”147—or, as 
she reportedly put it more pithily in oral argument, when “one sex has to put 
up with something that the other sex doesn’t have to put up with.”148 That 
kind of thing happens when members of a protected class have to deal with a 
constant gauntlet of insinuations that they do not belong in places where they 
have a right to be. 
V. ANTIGAY DISCRIMINATION AND MORAL DISTRESS
The tension between free speech and antidiscrimination law need not 
erupt into warfare, so long as the latter is construed in a way that does not 
expand to occupy all the cultural space.149 Free speech does not demand 
transparency in every context. In some contexts, insincerity is expected and 
normal, and a law that demands it in those contexts does not violate the First 
Amendment.150 Workplace harassment law could be deemed to be narrowly 
tailored to a compelling state interest. Even speech of the highest value can 
be excluded from a few places if the justification is urgent enough.151 But the 
complaint against Chick-fil-A expands the logic of that narrow exception to 
the entire world. Free speech demands that there be ample opportunity to 
express illiberal thoughts in a way that provokes moral distress. 
The Chick-fil-A case may seem fanciful. The Sweet Cakes litigation 
shows, however, that the pertinent tendency is not fanciful at all. 
There is not much doubt that the bakery, by refusing to bake for a same-
sex wedding, violated the prohibition on discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation. But the Oregon Labor Commissioner’s finding of liability and 
147 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).  
148 This quotation appears in Linda Greenhouse, Ginsburg at Fore in Court’s Give-and-Take, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, at A1.  
149 See KOPPELMAN, supra note 25, at 220–65. 
150 Shiffrin, for whom mutual transparency is a central free speech value, agrees with this. Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, What is Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 839, 863 
(2005). 
151 For example, a plurality of the Supreme Court upheld a content-based restriction on political 
speech—a ban on vote solicitation within 100 feet of a polling place, which the plurality deemed a 
“minor geographic limitation”—as necessary to compelling interests in preventing voter intimidation 
and election fraud. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210–11 (1992) (plurality opinion). I note again 
that the corresponding urgency in the context of harassment is confined to the workplace. See supra text 
accompanying notes 26–27. 
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the extraordinarily large damage award were crafted with no evident 
awareness that there was any free speech issue. 
Here are the facts, as the Commissioner found them. AK is the baker, 
the lesbian couple is RBC and LBC, and CM is RBC’s mother, who went 
with her to select the wedding cake: 
During the tasting, AK asked for the names of the bride and groom, and RBC 
told him there would be two brides and their names were “Rachel and Laurel.” 
At that point, AK stated that he was sorry, but that Sweetcakes did not make 
wedding cakes for same-sex ceremonies because of AK’s and his wife, MK’s, 
religious convictions. In response, RBC began crying. She felt that she had 
humiliated her mother and was anxious whether CM was ashamed of her, in 
that CM had believed that being a homosexual was wrong until only a few 
years earlier. CM then took RBC by the arm and walked her out of 
Sweetcakes to their car. On the way out to their car and in the car, RBC 
became hysterical and kept telling CM “I’m sorry,” because she felt that she 
had humiliated CM. 
 In the car, CM hugged RBC and assured her they would find someone to 
make a wedding cake. CM drove a short distance, then returned to Sweetcakes 
and re-entered Sweetcakes by herself to talk to AK. During their subsequent 
conversation, CM told AK that she used to think like him, but her “truth had 
changed” as a result of having “two gay children.” AK quoted Leviticus 18:22 
to CM, saying “You shall not lie with a male as one lies with a female; it is an 
abomination.” CM then left Sweetcakes and returned to the car. While CM 
was in Sweetcakes, RBC remained sitting in the car, “holding [her] head in 
her hands, just bawling.” 
 When CM returned to the car, she told RBC that AK had told her that “her 
children were an abomination unto God.” 
 When CM told RBC that AK had called her “an abomination,” this made 
RBC cry even more. RBC was raised as a Southern Baptist. The denial of 
service in this manner made her feel as if God made a mistake when he made 
her and that she wasn’t supposed to love or be loved, have a family, or go to 
heaven. 
 CM and RBC then drove home. RBC was crying when they arrived home 
and immediately went upstairs to her bedroom, followed by LBC and CM, 
where she lay in her bed, crying. In the bedroom, LBC asked CM what had 
happened, and CM told her that AK had told them that Sweetcakes did “not do 
same-sex weddings” and that AK had told CM that “your children are an 
abomination.” LBC was “flabbergasted” at AK’s statement about same-sex 
weddings. This upset her and made her very angry. 
 LBC, who was raised as a Catholic, recognized AK’s statement as a 
reference from Leviticus. She was “shocked” to hear that AK had referred to 
her as an “abomination,” and thought CM may have heard wrong. She took 
the denial of service in this manner to mean “this is a creature not created by 
God, not created with a soul; they are unworthy of holy love; they are not 
worthy of life.” She immediately thought that this never would have happened 
if she had not asked RBC to marry her and felt shame because of it. She also 
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worried that this might negatively impact CM’s acceptance of RBC’s sexual 
orientation. 
 LBC, who had always viewed herself as RBC’s protector, got into bed with 
RBC and tried to soothe her. RBC became even more upset and pushed LBC 
away. In response, LBC lost her temper and started yelling that she “could not 
believe this had happened” and that she could “fix” things if RBC would just 
let her. After LBC left the room, RBC continued crying and spent much of 
that evening in bed.152 
There is much more in this vein. The Commissioner found that the 
discrimination was “a clear and direct statement that RBC and LBC lacked 
an identity worthy of being recognized,” and that their reactions were “the 
reasonable and very real responses to not being allowed to participate in 
society like everyone else. The personal harm in being subjected to such 
separation is felt deeply and severely, as the evidence in this case 
indicated.”153 
Although it is hard not to feel sorry for RBC,154 much of what upset her 
was constitutionally protected speech. 
The Commission had also sought to give the complainants damages 
“for emotional suffering they experienced as a result of the media and 
social media attention generated by the case.”155 RBC and LBC had been 
subjected to vile and hateful comments on websites after the bakers 
publicized their case.156 Making Sweet Cakes liable for these, on the theory 
that they were foreseeable, implies that a party, subjected to a law he 
regards as unjust, must not complain publicly about that fact on pain of 
further financial penalty. This was too much for the Commissioner, who 
held without explanation that “the facts related solely to emotional harm 
resulting from media attention do not adequately support an award of 
damages.”157 
152 Klein final order, supra note 80, at 5–7 (internal citations omitted). 
153 Id. at 33. 
154 Like many gay people, she also has experienced a history of humiliation and discrimination that 
no one should ever have to go through. See Nigel Jaquiss, Bittersweet Cake, WILLAMETTE WK. (July 
21, 2015), http://www.wweek.com/portland/article-25119-bittersweet_cake.html [perma.cc/22AF-
D29J].  
155 Klein final order, supra note 80, at 40. 
The Agency’s theory of liability is that since Respondents brought the case to the media’s 
attention and kept it there by repeatedly appearing in public to make statements deriding 
Complainants, it was foreseeable that this attention would negatively impact Complainants, 
making Respondents liable for any resultant emotional suffering experienced by Complainants. 
The Agency also argues that Respondents are liable for negative third party social media directed 
at Complainants because it was a foreseeable consequence of the media attention.  
Id. 
156 For some ugly examples, see Jaquiss, supra note 154. 
157 Klein final order, supra note 80, at 40. The administrative law judge in the Klein matter had 
previously based the same conclusion on Anderson v. Fisher Broadcasting Comps. 712 P.2d 803, 804–
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The amount of damages is remarkable: $135,000 for a single refusal 
of service.158 Since the Commissioner recited the facts above “only to the 
extent necessary to provide context to Complainants’ claim for 
damages,”159 he must have regarded them as pertinent to that claim. The 
Commissioner implausibly claims that these damages “do not constitute a 
fine or civil penalty.”160 
Much of the emotional suffering that was the basis of the damage 
award was what Waldron calls “moral distress,” the pain of being 
confronted with unwelcome moral ideas.161 AK’s quotation of Leviticus 
implied that RBC ought to change her entire life, to repudiate the values 
that made sense of that life and embrace a different set of values that were 
profoundly alien to her.162 The preceding sentence describes all radical 
religious disagreement. Free speech protects the expression of such 
disagreement.163 Financially penalizing someone for expressing such views 
06 (Or. 1986) (holding that truthful presentation of facts concerning a person does not give rise to 
common law liability for emotional distress). Proposed Findings of Fact, Melissa Elaine Klein, Nos. 44-
14, 44-15, at 107 (Ore. Bur. Lab. & Indus. Apr. 21, 2015), 
http://www.oregon.gov/boli/SiteAssets/pages/press/Sweetcakes%20signed%20PO.pdf 
[perma.cc/9UZY-QUBF] [hereinafter Klein finding of fact].  
158 The amount of damages was particularly striking given that the administrative law judge had 
concluded that plaintiffs’ testimony about their emotional suffering was almost entirely in response to 
questions on how they felt about the media exposure—which both the ALJ and the Commissioner had 
concluded were not compensable harms. See Klein finding of fact, supra note 157, at 100, 102, 108. 
 The effect on the defendants was blunted by a crowdfunding campaign that raised $352,000 on their 
behalf. See Valerie Richardson, Sweet Cakes by Melissa Crowdfunder Breaks Record with $352K, 
WASH. TIMES (July 14, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jul/14/sweet-cakes-
melissa-crowdfunder-breaks-record-352k/ [perma.cc/4ZGW-HWA5]. This is not a sustainable solution 
for other, similar cases that are likely to arise in the future. 
159 Klein final order, supra note 80, at 3 n.2. 
160 Id. at 34.  
Any damages awarded do not constitute a fine or civil penalty, which the Commissioner has no 
authority to impose in a case such as this. Instead, any damages fairly compensate RBC and LBC 
for the harm they suffered and which was proven at hearing. This is an important distinction as 
this order does not punish respondents for their illegal conduct but, rather makes whole those 
subjected to the harm their conduct caused. 
 Id. 
161 See Waldron, supra note 128. 
162 I also note the detail, ignored by the Commissioner, that what RBC heard—which clearly was a 
major cause of her emotional distress—was not what AK said. CM inaccurately reported to RBC that 
AK had said that RBC’s children were abominations. See supra text accompanying note 152.  
 The pertinent passage from Leviticus condemns conduct, not persons, and in fact it does not even 
condemn lesbian sex. But even if AK had declared that RBC’s children were abominations, the First 
Amendment protects the right to say that, just as it protects the right to say near a funeral that you are 
happy that the mourner’s son is dead. See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 459–61 (2011). 
163 Carlos Ball argues that permitting merchants to announce their opposition to same-sex marriage 
“would compound rather than mitigate the harms at issue because it would make it known to the entire 
community that some of its merchants believe same-sex couples are unworthy of their services.” Ball, 
supra note 66, at 17. Free speech protects the right of those merchants to make their beliefs known to 
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is, from the standpoint of free speech, like financially penalizing someone 
for saying that the mayor should not be reelected. 
VI. SAVING CONSTRUCTIONS
Given the Supreme Court’s vagueness about the hostile environment 
question, local decisionmakers have a great deal of discretion. The Oregon 
episode shows how that discretion can be abused. Absent some free speech 
constraint, it is likely to be abused a lot more. 
The typical law review article on free speech law directs its 
recommendations to the Supreme Court. I have no illusion that they will 
pay any attention. Some of the very Justices who are most concerned about 
the impact of gay rights on religious dissenters have also crafted the most 
rigid rules of free speech law.164 
These judges tend to be very speech protective. But they also have 
declared their categorical unwillingness to craft any new exceptions to 
protection, which leaves them with the choice of either getting rid of all of 
harassment law or just ignoring the issue (as they are in fact doing). 
State courts, however, could solve the problem easily. The following 
argument is specifically addressed to them. 
A. Constitutional Avoidance
The Supreme Court has never dealt with the constitutional issues 
created by hostile environment law. But it has not declared that those issues 
do not exist, either; it has merely acted as if that were the case.165 In Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert it suggested that any law that penalizes speech on the basis 
of its content is suspect, thereby calling into question all of hostile 
environment law and much, much else.166 It is hard to tell what weight to 
give to Reed, because it is hard to believe the Court is serious. A significant 
the community. Ball is responding to a proposal that such announcements would trigger a right to 
discriminate, but the logic of his objection is not confined to that proposal. 
164 Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(legalization of same-sex marriage “creates serious questions about religious liberty”), with United 
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (opinion of the Court by Roberts, C.J.) (“The First 
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad 
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits . . . . Our Constitution forecloses any attempt to 
revise” the judgment that the benefits of First Amendment protections outweigh the costs “simply on 
the basis that some speech is not worth it.”); compare Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2638 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he majority’s decision threatens the religious liberty our Nation has long sought to 
protect.”), with Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (opinion of the Court by 
Thomas, J.) (“Government regulation of speech is content based,” and thus subject to strict scrutiny, “if 
a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.”). 
165 See supra text accompanying notes 13–17. 
166 See supra text accompanying notes 31–33. 
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body of scholarship does see the problem. It converges on the idea that the 
First Amendment protects at least a subset of the speech that could be 
construed as creating a hostile environment.167 There is, in short, a live First 
Amendment issue here. 
A familiar rule of statutory construction is the avoidance canon: 
“where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise 
serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid 
such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”168 The Court has embraced this as a “‘cardinal principle’ of 
statutory interpretation.”169 This canon can be relied on when construing 
state statutes that prohibit hostile environments in public accommodations. 
“Forty-nine state supreme courts have stated that they apply the canon of 
constitutional avoidance.”170 
In order to avoid constitutional difficulties, public accommodations 
law should be construed so that a business is not barred from publicly 
announcing its moral objection to homosexuality, or from publicly 
supporting antigay political causes. For the same reason, officials enforcing 
the laws should be aware, as the Oregon Commissioner was not, of the 
delicate free speech issues that are raised in these cases. And they should 
steer clear of them as much as they can.171 
At a minimum, a disclaimer should be deemed permissible. Grave 
constitutional doubts are raised by a restriction of speech, on a matter of 
public concern, that is not itself targeted harassment of a specific person or 
a threat to illegally discriminate. Public accommodation statutes that do not 
specifically prohibit such speech—and there is no statute that does—should 
not be construed to plunge into these treacherous waters. 
B. Drawing the Line
Two basic principles are at work here. Businesses have the right to 
speak to the public about matters of public concern. Businesses may not 
167 See supra note 86. 
168 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 
575 (1988) (citing NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 499–501, 504 (1979)).  
169 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 
(1932)).  
170 Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie 
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1949 & n.175 (2011) (providing extensive citations). Ironically, the one 
exception is Oregon. “Because the Oregon Supreme Court’s interpretation hierarchy essentially 
eliminates substantive canons, that court has only used the avoidance canon once in the past seventeen 
years. Oregon is therefore not included in the total tally.” Id. at 1949 n.175 (citation omitted). On the 
other hand, Oregon has not disavowed the canon either.  
171 I am attracted to Koontz’s doctrinal formulation; see supra note 86 and accompanying text; but 
any rule that licenses these results will do. 
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refuse to serve gay people or engage in speech that they know will be 
construed as such a refusal. 
An obvious place to draw the line is at the door of the business. A 
proprietor would be free to say what she liked away from work, but could 
not place these signs where the customers could see them. This, however, 
would not guarantee that no patron is made to feel unwelcome. The 
customer of Chick-fil-A did not need a sign on the premises in order to 
know what the owner thought. This solution would also have high free 
speech costs. The Supreme Court, when it struck down a ban on residential 
signs, observed that such signs “are an unusually cheap and convenient 
form of communication,” which, 
[e]specially for persons of modest means or limited mobility . . . may have no
practical substitute. Even for the affluent, the added costs in money or time of
taking out a newspaper advertisement, handing out leaflets on the street, or
standing in front of one’s house with a hand-held sign may make the
difference between participating and not participating in some public
debate.172
All these are equally true of small business owners. 
So we must consider letting businesses speak, so long as they do not 
engage in constructive refusals to serve. Just where is the line between the 
two? Consider a borderline case, a suggestion by Russell Nieli: 
 We are required by the Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) 
provision of New York State’s anti-discrimination statute to make our 
wedding facilities available to anyone who seeks to use them, including gay 
and lesbian couples who want to marry under New York’s same-sex marriage 
law. We believe strongly in the democratic process and the rule of law. For 
this reason, we will obey the state law governing our business. However, we 
obey this law only under the gravest protest, as we believe it violates our 
deepest moral and religious convictions. It does so needlessly and with 
apparent intent to polarize our country and inflame an already overheated 
cultural war. 
 We are Christians, and we believe that marriage is exclusively a 
relationship between one man and one woman. It should not, in our view, be 
construed as a relationship between people of the same sex or relationships 
involving three or more people. 
 We realize, however, that there are many people today who do not agree 
with us on these matters, and who hold their opposing views just as strongly 
as we hold ours. We respect the views of such people. We only ask that such 
people respect our own views in the same way that we respect theirs, and that, 
in the interest of tolerance and religious pluralism, they join us in seeking 
repeal of a law which requires us to violate our conscience. Those people who 
do not believe that marriage need be restricted to its traditional form and who 
172 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 57 (1994) (footnote and citations omitted).  
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seek a venue to celebrate non-traditional marriages have access to many other 
catering halls in this area that would be more than happy to accommodate 
their wishes. 
 Please do not ask us to violate our religious beliefs. We all must work 
together to accommodate our sincerely held differences in these matters. Our 
continued existence as a free, vibrant, tolerant and loving people surely 
depends upon it.173 
The last four sentences of Nieli’s announcement cross the line 
suggested by Koontz,174 since they are addressed directly and specifically to 
same-sex couples, rather than being an announcement to the world of the 
owner’s views. They clearly indicate that such couples are not welcome, 
and so are a constructive refusal to serve. They are also unnecessary. The 
preceding sentences make the owner’s views clear. 
The same effect can be achieved with a much briefer announcement. 
The New Mexico court175 evidently contemplated something like this: “We 
oppose same-sex marriage but we comply with applicable 
antidiscrimination laws.” 
The question whether any sign is a constructive refusal to serve is a 
contextual one, and so does not lend itself to a formulaic solution.176 The 
173 Russell Nieli, Gay Weddings and the Shopkeeper’s Dilemma, PUB. DISCOURSE (Dec. 17, 2014), 
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/12/14190 [perma.cc/9H6W-K5LK]. (Thanks to Reva Siegel 
for the reference.) I became aware of Nieli’s proposal after completing the first draft of this paper. I 
cheerfully acknowledge that he thought of a speech-based solution before I did. 
174 See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
175 See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59–70 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. 
Ct. 1787 (2014). 
176 The language I just described as a safe harbor on a website—“We oppose same-sex marriage 
but we comply with applicable antidiscrimination laws”—would be an appropriate basis for liability if 
the photographer came to the wedding with those words emblazoned on her shirt, because that would be 
a way of providing an inferior quality of service, just like a restaurant that provided food to black 
customers but otherwise treated them in a conspicuously insulting fashion. See supra note 76. Thanks to 
Sam Tenenbaum for the hypothetical. A similar disclaimer was deemed inadequate by the Supreme 
Court in Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 388–89 
(1973). In that case, a newspaper ran columns of employment advertisements designated “Jobs—Male 
Interest” and “Jobs—Female Interest” and headed each column with the following: 
Jobs are arranged under Male and Female classifications for the convenience of our readers. This 
is done because most jobs generally appeal more to persons of one sex than the other. Various 
laws and ordinances, local, state, and federal, prohibit discrimination in employment because of 
sex unless sex is a bona fide occupational requirement. Unless the advertisement itself specifies 
one sex or the other, job seekers should assume that the advertiser will consider applicants of 
either sex in compliance with the laws against discrimination. 
Id. at 381 n.7. The Court responded: “It suffices to dispose of this contention by noting that the 
Commission’s commonsense recognition that the two are connected is supported by evidence in the 
present record.” Id. In that case, however, the announcement was a reliable indicator of covert, 
undetectable, illegal discrimination. With public accommodations, any violation of antidiscrimination 
law will immediately be obvious, and so the danger that the announcement would signal and abet 
actual, undetectable law violations is attenuated. The assumed connection is thus unsupported here. See 
also Hailes v. United Air Lines, 464 F.2d 1006, 1009 (5th Cir. 1972) (considering the issue whether 
defendant’s behavior “inculcate[d] a reasonable belief on [plaintiff’s] part that applying [for 
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New Mexico court, however, offers a template and should provide a safe 
harbor. 
A different solution that requires no new legislation, in my judgment 
less attractive than the disclaimer just described, might be for the 
businesses in question to identify themselves as “Christian.” The 
inclination of some businesses thus to identify themselves has been 
deferentially acknowledged by the Supreme Court.177 Little authority 
addresses whether identifying as “Christian” can violate the prohibition on 
declaring that some customers are unwelcome, but what there is suggests 
that this is a legitimate form of self-identification.178 
If conservative Christian businesses began adopting this strategy, there 
would obviously be some obfuscation going on, trafficking in the fact that 
only recently has the label “Christian” come to be understood as referring 
specifically to (or, at least, as the object of attempted appropriation by) 
Evangelicals. This use of the term would make it even more specific, 
referring to alienation engendered by the culture wars.179 Identifying 
religion with one political faction is obviously bad for religion. It has 
already played a role in the dramatic reduction in the number of Americans 
who self-identify as Christian.180 From the perspective of conservative 
Christians, the New Mexico solution should be a better answer. 
CONCLUSION 
In its earliest formulations, free speech was part of the practice of 
religious toleration. The idea of toleration has not attracted much interest 
on either side of the gay rights controversy. Toleration—“from the Latin 
tolerare: to put up with [or] countenance”—“refers to . . . non-interference 
with beliefs [or] actions . . . that one considers to be wrong.”181 It implies 
employment] was a futile gesture”), cited with approval in Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 381 n.7. The 
question of what constitutes a threat—whether to discriminate or to do anything else—is inevitably 
context dependent. See Kenneth L. Karst, Threats and Meanings: How the Facts Govern First 
Amendment Doctrine, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1337 (2006). 
177 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764–66 (2014). 
178 The Alaska Attorney General opined that that state’s law was not violated by bed-and-breakfast 
advertisements referring to “Christian home” or “Christian environment,” holding that these did not 
imply that non-Christian guests were unwelcome. Content of Advert. in State Tourist Guide, 1994 
Alaska Op. Att’y Gen. (Inf.) 151 (1994), 1994 WL 178695. Less defensible was a New York court’s 
determination that a resort’s advertisement, “Serving Christian Clientele since 1911,” did not indicate 
that non-Christians were unwelcome. Trowbridge v. Katzen, 203 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738–40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1960). 
179 On this point I am indebted to conversation with Winnifred Fallers Sullivan. 
180 See Koppelman, supra note 46, at 655–57.  
181 Rainer Forst, Toleration, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (May 4, 2012), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration/ [perma.cc/XA7K-9LPD]. 
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that there is something wrong with what is tolerated. Goethe declared: “To 
tolerate means to insult.”182 
This condescending implication of toleration was always apparent to 
the gay rights movement, which therefore had no interest in it. Proponents 
of gay rights—I have long been one of them183—have argued, with growing 
success, that there is nothing inferior about gay people, that homosexuality 
is a benign variation. The same-sex marriage issue was well suited to this 
reversal of traditional heterosexism. Married people have sex. Society 
knows that they have sex. It thinks that is ok. In fact, it is more than ok; it is 
expected, and good. The stigma against homosexuality is tightly tied to the 
condemnation of homosexual sex acts. That is why the nationwide 
recognition of same-sex marriage184 is such a decisive victory. It necessarily 
reverses this valuation. It implies that homosexual sex is good. 
This same movement has developed an antidiscrimination ethic that 
condemned the traditional condemnation. This often comes advertised as a 
matter of secular rationality. Actually, it takes us into the realm of pollution 
and taboo. Liberal theorists are uncomfortable with the invocation of such 
primitive impulses, but they appear to be an ineradicable part of humanity’s 
moral vocabulary.185 As with racism, the stigmatization of gays is so deeply 
182 Id. 
183 See, e.g., KOPPELMAN, supra note 25, at 146–76; Andrew Koppelman, Judging the Case 
Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 431 (2014); Andrew Koppelman, Why Scalia Should 
Have Voted to Overturn DOMA, 108 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 131 (2013); Andrew Koppelman, 
Response: Sexual Disorientation, 100 GEO. L.J. 1083 (2012); Andrew Koppelman, DOMA, Romer, and 
Rationality, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 923 (2010); Andrew Koppelman, Defending the Sex Discrimination 
Argument for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Reply to Edward Stein, 49 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 519 (2001), 
reprinted in 1 THE DUKEMINIER AWARDS: BEST SEXUAL ORIENTATION LAW REVIEW ARTICLES OF 
2001 at 49 (2002); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the Defense of Marriage Act is 
Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, Is Marriage Inherently 
Heterosexual?, 42 AM. J. JURIS. 51 (1997); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians 
and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The 
Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988). I also 
coauthored amicus briefs in Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court case that invalidated laws against 
homosexual sex, and Hollingsworth v. Perry and Obergefell v. Hodges, both of which considered a 
right to same-sex marriage. See Brief of Amici Curiae Constitutional Law Professors Bruce A. 
Ackerman et al. in Support of Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 
2003 WL 136139; Brief of Amici Curiae William N. Eskridge Jr. et al. in Support of Respondents, 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), 2013 WL 840011; Brief Amicus Curiae 
of Legal Scholars Stephen Clark et al., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, 14-
562, 14-571 and 14-574), 2015 WL 1048436. 
184 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
185 See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS
AND RELIGION 170–77 (2012). Liberals do tend to be in denial about the importance of disgust in their 
moral outlook. See Dan Kahan, Is Disgust “Conservative”? Not in a Liberal Society (or Likely 
Anywhere Else), CULTURAL COGNITION PROJECT (May 9, 2013, 10:20 AM), 
http://www.culturalcognition.net/blog/2013/5/9/is-disgust-conservative-not-in-a-liberal-society-or-
likely-a.html [https://perma.cc/2X6X-BSAR]. 
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rooted in American culture that it is probably necessary to construct this 
kind of counter-taboo in order to respond to it. In each case, the aim is to 
induce citizens to regard the relevant prejudice as itself ritually unclean. 
But this weapon is, if you will pardon the expression, undiscriminating. It 
can lead to the kind of mindless lashing out, such as treating innocent 
people as vile contaminants, that was a depressingly familiar part of gay 
life in America for so many years.186 
Conservatives moved toward a more tolerant position over time, 
silently shifting away from vigorous enforcement of sodomy laws toward a 
position of merely insisting on the superior status of heterosexual 
marriage.187 Now they have suddenly become very interested in toleration, 
because the status of inferior insiders188 has suddenly been imposed on 
them. Maggie Gallagher worries that those who oppose same-sex marriage 
will be regarded “as hateful bigots whose beliefs must be suppressed by 
operation of law.”189 Justice Alito, dissenting in the Supreme Court’s 
186 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2035 (2000) 
(reviewing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 
(1999)).  
187 For example, Professor Robert P. George of Princeton University, one of the most articulate 
opponents of same-sex marriage, argued that sodomy prohibitions are not in principle unjust. See 
ROBERT P. GEORGE, THE CLASH OF ORTHODOXIES: LAW, RELIGION, AND MORALITY IN CRISIS 108 
(2001). He co-authored an amicus brief that defended the constitutionality of such laws. See Brief of 
Amicus Curiae of the Family Research Council, Inc. and Focus on the Family in Support of the 
Respondent, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102), 2003 WL 470066. A few years 
later, he wrote that opposing same-sex marriage “certainly isn’t about legalizing (or criminalizing) 
anything,” for “[i]n all fifty of the United States, two men or women can have a [ceremony] . . . and 
share a domestic life” if they wish. ROBERT P. GEORGE, What Marriage Is—and What It Isn’t, in 
CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES: CONFRONTING THE DOGMAS OF LIBERAL SECULARISM 126, 130 
(2013). He also increasingly focuses on the danger to religious liberty. See ROBERT P. GEORGE, The 
Myth of a “Grand Bargain” on Marriage, in CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES: CONFRONTING THE 
DOGMAS OF LIBERAL SECULARISM, supra, at 143; Rick Plasterer, Opinion, Robert George Discusses 
Same-Sex Marriage and Its Social Consequences, CHRISTIAN POST (June 26, 2015, 11:05 AM), 
http://www.christianpost.com/news/robert-george-discusses-same-sex-marriage-and-its-social-
consequences-140891/#j40TzxWPIJgEGC0W.99 [perma.cc/BGT4-SJ6P]. Thanks to Steve Heyman for 
most of these citations. 
188  This term 
applies to persons whose divergence from some norm is considered tolerable, but who are thereby 
relegated to inferior social status. The archetype of this category is probably the bottom of the 
caste system in India: it is not morally or politically wrong to be an Untouchable—indeed, it is 
right and necessary that the state and the world include Untouchables—but being an Untouchable 
relegates one to the bottom of society.  
John Eastburn Boswell, Jews, Bicycle Riders, and Gay People: The Determination of Social Consensus 
and Its Impact on Minorities, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 205, 209 (1989). 
189 Maggie Gallagher, Why Accommodate? Reflections on the Gay Marriage Culture Wars, 5 NW.
J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 260, 269 (2010). This may be an appropriate place to note the silliness of the debate,
which is taken seriously in some quarters, over whether opposition to same-sex marriage is
appropriately labeled “bigotry.” The label is analytically useless. Merriam-Webster defines a bigot as “a
person who strongly and unfairly dislikes other people, ideas, etc.,” or “a person who is obstinately or
intolerantly devoted to his or her own opinions and prejudices.” Bigot, MERRIAM-WEBSTER,
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decision recognizing the right of same-sex couples to marry, feared that the 
Court’s decision would be used “to vilify Americans who are unwilling to 
assent to the new orthodoxy.”190 
They are right to worry. The conservative columnist Rod Dreher 
describes an emerging consensus on the right “that the most important goal 
at this stage is not to stop gay marriage entirely but to secure as much 
liberty as possible for dissenting religious and social conservatives while 
there is still time.”191 Efforts to secure legislative relief, by enacting 
religious exemptions from public accommodations laws, have met with 
disaster.192 
I suggest that we take a longer view. The core issue of religious 
toleration has been resolved in the United States, not by the religion clauses 
of the Constitution, but by the protection of free speech. Heresy is 
protected. Blasphemy is protected. Justice Holmes observed long ago that 
free speech means “not free thought for those who agree with us but 
freedom for the thought that we hate.”193 
This one is hated a lot. Discrimination has become a kind of 
blasphemy, declaring worthless that which most of us value. Free speech 
has protected blasphemers and heretics. It should offer comparable 
protection here. 
Clear signals about merchants’ views of same-sex marriage would 
prevent the nastiest collisions between religious conservatives and gay 
people. It would have been better if the stubborn proprietors of Sweet 
Cakes had never met the spectacularly sensitive plaintiffs in Klein. Those 
plaintiffs reacted badly to rejection, but it is hard to believe that even they 
would actively seek out the likes of Sweet Cakes and insist on giving them 
their money.194 Weddings are expensive. 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bigot [perma.cc/6QRQ-UD9W]. The question then 
reduces to what it would have been without the “bigotry” issue, whether the arguments against same-
sex marriage are persuasive. 
190 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2642 (2015) (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2639 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (warning of “potentially ruinous consequences for religious liberty”). 
191 Rod Dreher, Does Faith = Hate?: Gay Marriage and Religious Liberty are Uneasy Bedfellows, 
AM. CONSERVATIVE, Sept./Oct. 2013, at 12. 
192 See supra notes 49–54 and accompanying text. 
193 United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
194 After the Commissioner’s order, one of the plaintiffs said that the nasty surprise was one of the 
primary reasons for her complaint: “Why would they not tell us in one of the emails, before ever 
allowing us to come into the shop and be humiliated like that?” Jaquiss, supra note 154. (They did not 
tell them because they did not know at the time that they were dealing with a same-sex couple.) Sweet 
Cakes did actively seek out gay rights groups after the Commissioner’s order, sending ten of them cakes 
with “We really do love you” on them to emphasize that the bakery offered Christian love to everyone. 
Nicole Hensley, Former Oregon Bakers Behind Gay Discrimination Fine Ship Cakes to Skeptical 
LGBT Centers: ‘We Really Do Love You!’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 21, 2015, 6:04 PM), 
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The Supreme Court has made such a mess of free speech doctrine that 
it is impossible to tell whether this signaling is protected. For purposes of 
interpreting state antidiscrimination statutes, however, the mess may not 
matter. The rule of avoidance of constitutional difficulties should be 
enough to induce state courts to construe their statutes so that they do not 
prohibit this kind of speech. 
I, and I suspect many of you reading this (given the cultural 
proclivities of the professional class that reads law reviews), regard the 
conservative Christians’ views about homosexuality as utterly wrong, 
worthless, and harmful.195 It would be a better world if no one held such 
ideas. (Of course, they think the same about us.) 
But I can think that without being indifferent to the rights of those 
who believe they have a duty not to facilitate same-sex marriages. I do not 
want to hurt those people.196 I just want to stop them from hurting gay 
people. 
One of the deep roots of the sexual revolution was Herbert Marcuse’s 
suggestion in Eros and Civilization that we should seek to abolish “surplus-
repression,” repression that exceeds the needs of civilization.197 Marcuse 
was thinking of sexual repression, and the ideal of sexual liberation that he 
articulated in 1955 has rocked our world. But the same point can be made 
about the repression of conservative Christians. Some repression of sexual 
urges is necessary for civilization. So is the repression of some kinds of 
religiosity. But we should minimize the surplus. 
Even if you want to hurt them, you should notice that they have rights. 
One of the most robust redoubts of toleration is free speech. Here we 
institutionalize toleration of those we regard with horror. Opponents of 
same-sex marriage have the right to be treated at least as well as we treat 
Nazis and Communists. 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/anti-gay-marriage-ore-bakers-ship-cakes-lgbt-centers-
article-1.2333694 [perma.cc/66B4-65SJ]. This, too, is protected by freedom of speech. 
195 It is most harmful to the adolescents within that group who discover that they are attracted to 
persons of the same sex, confide in their parents, and are thrown out of the house. See Alex Morris, The 
Forsaken: A Rising Number of Homeless Gay Teens Are Being Cast Out by Religious Families, 
ROLLING STONE (Sept. 3, 2014), http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/the-forsaken-a-rising-
number-of-homeless-gay-teens-are-being-cast-out-by-religious-families-20140903 [perma.cc/XF2W-
9ZVS]. This pathology cannot be addressed by antidiscrimination law, however. It also should not be a 
matter of moral disagreement, because it is pathological even within the terms of the moral worldview 
that holds that homosexual conduct is never permissible. Almost everyone who holds that view also 
would agree that one has a moral duty not to initiate a chain of events that has the predictable 
consequence of causing a teenager to become a homeless prostitute or drug addict, which is what 
happens to many of these children. Id. 
196 Some of them are friends of mine. 
197 HERBERT MARCUSE, EROS AND CIVILIZATION: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO FREUD 35–39 
(2d ed. 1966). 
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